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Private Law Beyond the State?
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization*
Although the changing relation between private law and the state
has become the subject of many debates, these debates are often unsatisfactory. Concepts like "law," "privatelaw," and "globalization"have
unclear and shifting meanings; discussions are confined to specific
questions and do not connect with parallel discussions taking place
elsewhere. In order to initiate the necessary broader approach, this
article brings together the pertinent themes and aspects from various
debates. It proposes a conceptual clarificationof key notions in the debate-"private law," "state," "Europeanization,""globalization,"and
should be of use beyond the immediate purposes
"privatization"-that
of the rest of the article. It also suggests how one should analyze and
categorize both the problems the modern developments create and the
solutions that these problems might call for. It does not attempt to
analyze which solution is the best one. But in unveiling common structures, both within and between the various debates, this articleshould
help significantly in providing the further discussion of these solutions within a more rationalframework.

I.

THEME

Europeanization, globalization, and private governance mean
different things to different people, but one thing seems clear: they
change the role of the state in the world. Legal scholars have analyzed at length the impact these developments have on the law. Most
of these studies focus on public, especially constitutional, law; they
ask how democracy and proper governance structures can be recre* This article was written as preparatory material for a joint conference of the
American Journalof Comparative Law and Rabels Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches und
InternationalesPrivatrecht(RabelsZ)entitled "Beyond the State-Rethinking Private
Law" to be held at the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg on July 12-14, 2007. For
further information, see www.private-law.org. Since this article is prepared for an
American-German conference, emphasis in the references is on American and
German publications. Where possible, both the German original and the English
translation of sources are referenced; the translations [cited in brackets] follow the
originals. Thanks for valuable comments are due to Richard Buxbaum, James
Gordley, Joan Magat and Mathias Reimann; thanks for last minute editing to Neylan
Girel.
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ated or replaced outside the state. The impact on private law, by contrast, has received comparably less attention, with two exceptions:
the (somewhat unspecific) claim that globalization transcends the
distinction between public law and private law in a new way," and
the (public-law inspired) question to what extent private arrangements can compete with or substitute for the state. 2
The reason for this relative neglect of private law in comparison
to public law may lie in two irreconcilable assumptions. The first assumption, frequent among students of globalization, is that private
law is not different from public law ("all law is public law"), so private
law is automatically included in any analysis of law under globalization. The second assumption, frequent among private-law scholars, is
that private law is already independent from the state, so any change
in the role of the state has no impact on private law. Both assumptions are plausible, but they are mutually exclusive: private law can
be bound to the state like public law or be separate, but not both.3
More importantly, both assumptions have different implications for
private law: if private law is public law, then a changed role of the
state implies a change for private law; if private law is independent of
the state, no such change ensues. This suggests that it matters which
of the assumptions (if any) is correct, and that the impact of globalization, Europeanization, and private governance on private law deserves special attention. To what extent is the state the blind spot in
our thinking about private law? Is private law beyond the state still
"law"; is private law within the state still "private"? To what extent
does private law presuppose the state; to what extent is it irreconcilable with the state? To what extent can private law in the "postnational constellation" learn from its experience before and within the
state?
This article, together with a companion piece, 4 addresses these
questions by looking at American and German concepts and views, in
particular. This is no easy task. Core concepts are unclear; several
debates exist with no clear connection to each other; normative and
analytical perspectives are confused. In this situation, these two articles cannot provide definite answers to the various questions involved. Their more modest, but all the more important, aim is to
1. For more thoughtful analyses making this point, see Harold Hongju Koh,
TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996); Paul Schift Berman,
From InternationalLaw to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485,
518-23 (2005).
2. In this specific sense, "private law is a central subject in globalization discourse." Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization,
38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.& POL. 1, 3 (2006). For discussion, see infra, part III.C.
3. These are two endpoints of a continuum: private law can be more or less
independent.
4. Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, PrivateLaw and the State: Comparative Perceptions and Historical Observations, 71/2 RABELSZ (forthcoming 2007).
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survey and organize the separate discussions and unveil internal connections between them, so the questions raised can be addressed in a
more comprehensive and productive manner. Whereas the other article provides a historical and comparative analysis of the issues involved, this article will collect, analyze, and structure the different
debates in legal theory and comparative law concerning the effects
Europeanization, globalization and privatization have on private law.
The article is organized as follows. Part II shows traditional
views of the relation between private law and the state. It demonstrates how traditional definitions of, and relations between, the central concepts "private law" and "state" differ, both within and
between U.S. and German legal discourses; it also discusses the thesis of the simultaneous rise of the state and decline of private law.
Part III describes the developments that have called the traditional
views into question, grouped under three headings: Europeanization,
globalization, and privatization; it also discusses the counter-thesis of
a simultaneous decline of the state and rise of private law. Part IV
describes four issues that arise because of these developments that
would have seemed less problematic under the traditional views: the
validity, method, legitimacy, and autonomy of private law. Part V describes various responses to these issues and groups them into types
of answers according to the respective role of the state. Although the
point of this article is not how one should respond, some important
insights that should shape future debates do emerge; these are distilled in Part VI.
This is a survey article, an effort to map a number of debates and
viewpoints; it is not a position paper. Many views are presented because they are relevant or prominent in debates, not because we
share them; we take no position on their value. The extensive footnotes in this article serve not only as references for statements in the
text, but also as entry points into different aspects of the academic
debate. In addition, the article makes three contributions. First, this
article brings together the various themes and aspects connected
with the topic of private law and the state under the influence of Europeanization, globalization, and privatization. Although individual
aspects have often been discussed in different places, this is the first
attempt to combine them in one framework. Second, we suggest that
most of the writing on this topic can best be understood in terms of
the issues that the article distinguishes and describes. Too many discussions suffer from participants inadvertently using different or unclear concepts. While it is not necessary (or even desirable) to confine
debate to only one meaning, awareness of the different meanings is
necessary to avoid misunderstandings. To this end, the article proposes a conceptual clarification of key notions in the debate-"private
law" and "state," as well as "Europeanization," "globalization," and
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"privatization"-that should be of use beyond the immediate purposes of the rest of the article. Third, this article suggests how one
should categorize both the problems the modern developments create
and the solutions that these problems might call for. It does not attempt to analyze which solution is the best one. But in unveiling common structures both within and between the various debates, it
should help significantly in rationalizing the further discussion of
these solutions.

II.

CONCEPTS

Even within the Western legal tradition,5 the relationship between private law and the state is not uniform. Not only has it
changed over time, but it is also viewed differently among different
countries. A comparison between U.S. and German approaches, especially, reveals enlightening similarities and differences, since both
the state and the idea of private law have been differently defined
and have played different roles in German and American legal
discourses.
A.

Private Law

Comparatists have found that the concept of private law, and its
distinction from public law, play a far greater role in Europe than in
the United States, and they have sought historical and institutional
reasons for this.6 However, they have widely avoided a logically prior
issue: what is meant by private law in the U.S. and in Germany, respectively.7 When we speak of private law, we often assume, implicitly, the existence of a universal core meaning for the term, one
typically focused on contracts and contract law. Yet beyond such a
5. Both the state and private law are originally Western concepts that were exported elsewhere; a discussion focusing on societies beyond Europe and North
America would raise numerous additional issues beyond the scope of this article.
6. The most comprehensive comparison is John Henry Merryman, The PublicLaw /Private-Law Distinctionin European and American Law, 17 J. PUB. L. 3 (1968).
See also JOHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 91-99 (2d ed. 1985); Roscoe
Pound, Public Law and Private Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 469 (1939); Martin Shapiro,
From Public Law to Public Policy, or the "Public"in "PublicPolicy," 5 POLITICAL ScIENCE 410 (1972); RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 272-76, 539-60
(6th ed. 1998); MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 106-24 (2d ed. 1999). For comparison of French and English law, see J.W.F.
ALLISON, A CorlINENTAL DISTINCTION IN THE COMMON LAW (1996) and the critical
review by Nils Jansen, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT (ZEuP) 971
(1997); THE PUBLIc LAW / PRIVATE LAw DIVIDE: UNE ENTENTE ASSEZ CORDIALE? (JeanBernard Auby & Mark Freeland eds., 2006). The distinction is defended as useful for

the (English) common law by Geoffrey Samuel, Public and Private Law: A Private
Lawyer's Response, 46 MOD. L. REV. 558 (1983).
7. E.g., Merryman, The Public-Law/Private-Law Distinction,supra note 6, at 4.
For an exception, see Duncan Kennedy, Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and
National Traditionsin PrivateLaw, in THE POLITICS OF A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 9, 10
(Martijn W. Hesselink ed., 2006).
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core meaning, it is not even clear whether private law always means
the same thing within one legal tradition, let alone among different
traditions.
Traditionally, private law rests on the law of obligations (both
contractual and non-contractual), the law of property (including succession law), and the law of persons (including family law). It includes those areas of commercial law that extend the law of contracts
(e.g., the law of unfair competition), the law of property (e.g., intellectual property) and the law of persons (e.g., corporate law). It excludes
those areas that are not based on such extensions and are therefore
seen as (merely) regulatory public law (e.g., antitrust law). This
traditional definition holds, generally, for most purposes in American
and German law.8 However, once scholars on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean went further and formulated criteria to define private law,
usually in opposition to public law, they found important differences.9 These criteria are important in two ways. First, they define
the object of private law debate-what counts or does not count as
private law. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they define what
makes private law specific-what its inner rationalities are. In fact, a
comparative survey reveals no less than seven different concepts, and
0
shows their respective roles are different in Germany and the U.S.1
1. PrivateInterests. In the 3rd century A.D., Ulpian defined private law as the law that concerns private, as opposed to public, interests.'1 In Germany, this is still one of the most frequently articulated
distinctions between private and public law. In the U.S., Ulpian's def8. See the contents of MATHIAS REIMANN, EINFUHRUNG IN DAS US-AMERIKANISCHE PRIVATRECHT (2d ed. 2004); PETER HAY, US-AMERIKANISCHEs RECHT ch. 5 (2d ed.
2002).
9. For an overview of the three most important approaches in German law (interest, subject, and subordination theory), see Dirk Ehlers, in FRIEDRICH SCHOCH, EBERHARD SCHMIDT-A8MANN & RAINER PIETZNER, VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG, Art.
14, nos. 220-38 (14th ed. 2005); for different approaches in U.S. law, see Randy A.

Barnett, Foreword:Four Senses of the Public-PrivateLaw Distinction, 9 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 267, 267-72 (1986). Seventeen distinctions are listed in JAKOB HOLLIGER,

DAs KRITERIUM DES GEGENSATZES ZWISCHEN DEM OFFENTLICHEN UND DEM PRIVATRECHT, DARGESTELLT IM PRINZIP UND IN EINIGEN ANWENDUNGEN (1904).
10. For the purpose of this article, we neglect the U.S. concept of "private laws" as
laws for the benefit of specific individuals, as opposed to "public laws" applicable to all
individuals. The term and its definition can be found in BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES
85 (1st ed. 1765); its origins go back to the earliest times of statutory law. For much of
the 19th century, this was the nearly exclusive meaning of the term in American judicial opinions.
11. Dig. 1.1.1. (Ulpian); Inst. 1.1.4 (Ulpian); for an early use in an English language treatise, see JOHN ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 1.9 (1773);
for the history of the idea in Germany, see Michael Stolleis, Offentliches Recht und
Privatrechtim Proze3 der Entstehung des modernen Staates, in UFFENTLICHES RECHT
UND PRIVATRECHT ALS WECHSELSEITIGE AUFFANGORDNUNGEN 41, 45-59 (Wolfgang
Hoffmann-Riem & Eberhard Schmidt-ABmann eds., 1996). Ulpian was a late classical
lawyer and one of the most influential officials in the Roman Empire; for a biography
and evaluation, see ToNY HONORt, ULPIAN: PIONEER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); see id.
98 on public and private law.
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inition is rarely found as such, 12 but a similar criterion appears
whenever private law is defined as that part of the law that protects
and enforces private rights. The practical use of the distinction is limited, since it is widely accepted that all laws serve both private and
public interests.13
2. CorrectiveJustice. A second definition gives the first more analytical bite: Private law is the body of those rules aimed at corrective
justice, as opposed to rules of public law aimed at distributive justice.14 This may explain how tort law can be viewed as public law in
the United States (where its function is seen more in the distribution
of risks than in the compensation of harm)15 and as private law in
Germany (where the emphasis is on compensation). At the same
time, the example suggests why this definition of private law is problematical, at least as an a priori definition without further elaboration. 6 Most areas of the law are hard to place-tort law is only one
example,' 7 even contract law is ambiguous.' 8 Institutions frequently
serve both distributive and corrective justice, and it may be artificial
if not outright impossible to somehow separate the one from the
other. Indeed, some think private law always fulfills both corrective
and distributive purposes.' 9
12. But see, for a use of the distinction based on Ulpian, Frederick Pollock, Divisions in the Law, 8 HARV. L. REV. 187, 192-93 (1894); see also Ludwik Ehrlich, Comparative Public Law and the Fundamentalsof its Study, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 63132 (1921).
13. This point is not new; Azo made it as early as ca. 1210 in his Summa Codicis,
Inst. 11, no. 12, in opposition to the strict distinction of private and public law proposed by Placentinus.
14. GUSTAV RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 123 (5th ed. 1956) [Legal Philosophy,
in THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN 43, 153 (1950)]; ERNEST
J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw (1995) 74 et seq.; see also Stephan Meder, Der

Begriff des Privatrechts als Kriterium rechtsgeschichtlicher Forschung. Zur
Bedeutung des Kompensationsmodells fir die Neuere Privatrechtsgeschichte,19 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR NEUERE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 249 (1997).

15. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEx. L. REV. 1, 257 (19591960); but see the responses by Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and PrivateOrdering,35
ST. Louis U.L.J. 623 (1991); John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the
Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 3 (2004).
16. See Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 11.6. Arguably, private law is structured by principles of corrective justice that may be complemented by considerations
of distributive justice. This corresponds with how individuals typically assess tort
claims; see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, An EmpiricalInquiry into the Relation of Corrective Justice to Distributive Justice, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 421

(2006).
17.

NILs JANSEN, DIE STRUKTUR DES HAFTUNGSRECHTS. GESCHICHTE, THEORIE UND
DOGMATIK AUSSERVERTRAGLICHER ANSPROCHE AUF SCHADENSERSATz 89-136 (2003).

18. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J.
472 (1980); CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, DIE BEDEUTUNG DER IUSTITIA DISTRIBUTIVA IM
DEUTSCHEN VERTRAGSRECHT 78-122 (1997).

19. Supra notes 17 and 18; Hanoch Dagan, The DistributiveFoundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138, 147-50 (1999); JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF
PRIVATE LAW. PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 8-14 (2006).
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3. Relations between PrivateParties.According to a third distinction, private law concerns relations between private parties, whereas
public law concerns relations that include the state in its role of sovereign (rather than that of a market participant). Although this distinction exists in both legal systems, it seems to have a stronger hold
in Germany. 20 Only the German legal system seems to conclude that
all relations to the state acting as sovereign are part of public law.
For example, contracts between governmental agencies and individuals are, in Germany, undoubtedly part of public law, even if some
21
private law provisions apply to them by analogy. By contrast, in the
U.S., the rise of the "contracting state" signals transcendence of the
public law/private law distinction: when the state regulates by con22
tract, it makes use of private law.
4. Horizontality. A fourth distinction generalizes the third: private law is characterized by horizontal relations of equality; public
law is characterized by a vertical relation of subordination and dominance. Whether the state acts through private or through public law
depends on whether the partner on the other side is treated as a coequal or as a subject. More importantly perhaps, this theory makes it
possible to characterize relations between private parties as public
law if they are characterized by subordination and dominance, as in,
for example, employment contracts. As a consequence, public law restraints on government action can be applied to powerful private actors-corporations in particular-as well. The theory is usually
modified to exclude this possibility, but the integration of public law
considerations into imbalanced private relationships is still
discussed.
5. Private Ordering. A fifth tradition equates private law with
private ordering. Since private ordering concerns the distribution of
goods, services, and capital through contracts, contracts and property
are the core elements of private law in both the U.S. and Germany.
But private ordering can encompass other areas of the law as well,
and this is where the definition plays out differently in these two legal systems. In Germany, it is used to define private law in a general
sense as areas of the law that are typically open to private ordering.
The U.S. definition, by contrast, looks at individual rules and relations. This makes for a subtle but important difference: In the U.S.
legal system, the core of private law is the contract. In consequence,
20. For an (unsuccessful) attempt to import it into U.S. law, see Ernst Freund,
Private Claims against the State, 8 POL. ScL. Q. 625, 640-51 (1893).
21. See Ralf Michaels, Systemfragen des Schuldrechts, in 2 HISTORISCHKRITISCHER KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB no. 63-65 (Reinhard Zimmermann et al. eds.,
2007); in more detail, PEER ZUMBANSEN, ORDNUNGSMUSTER IM MODERNEN
WOHLFAHRTSSTAAT 192-99 (2000).
22. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543
(2000); Janet McLean, Government to State: Globalization, Regulation, and Governments as Legal Persons, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 173, 183-92 (2003).
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all matters become private law once they can be regulated through
party autonomy. 23 In this reading, mandatory norms of contract law
are not private law, 2 4 whereas consensual agreements between citizens and public entities are; family law is private law to the extent it
rests on private agreements. 25 By contrast, the core of German private law is not the contract 26 but the law of contract.In consequence,
private law encompasses all other areas of the law that are closely
related to contract law-the law of non-contractual obligations, property law, and-though for somewhat different reasons-family law2 7
and the law of successions. Whether the norms in these areas are
mandatory or not is irrelevant to their classification as private law.
On the other hand, contracts with the government are public law.
6. Privately Made Law. A related sixth distinction exists between
privately made law-norms created by private parties-and publicly
made law-norms created by the state. In U.S. literature, such privately made norms are now repeatedly referred to and discussed as
law. 2 8 By contrast, German scholars predominantly confine the notion of privately made "law" to law made on the basis of powers delegated by the state. 2 9
23. For an isolated adoption of such a view in Switzerland, see WALTHER BURCKHARDT, DIE ORGANISATION DER RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT. UNTERSUCHUNGEN OBER DIE
EIGENART DES PRIVATRECHTS, DES STAATSRECHTS UND DES VOLKERRECHTS 16-20, 27

(1927); see also Helmut Coing & Heinrich Honsell, Einleitung zum Birgerlichen
Gesetzbuch, in J. VON STAUJDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, no.
113 (2004).
24. This definition existed already in Roman law; see Dig. 2.14.38 (Papinian), "Ius
publicum quod privatorumpactis mutari non potest" [public law is that which cannot
be changed through agreements by the parties]; see Max Kaser, 'Ius publicum' und
'ius privatum', 103 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FOR RECHTSGESCHICHTEROMANISTISCHE AIBTEILUNG 1, 75-88 (1986).
25. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Marriageas a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (suggesting an analogy between
private ordering in the family and in the market). See also Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443; Jeffrey Stake et al., Roundtable: Opportunities for and Limitations of Private Ordering in Family Law, 73 IND. L.J. 535
(1998).
26. The contract itself is not viewed as a source of law; see already FRIEDRICH
CARL VON SAVIGNY, I SYSTEM DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS 12 (1840); more generally, see
GESETZ UND VERTRAG II. 12. SYMPOSION DER KomMISSIoN "DIE FUNKTION DES
GESETZES IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART" (Okko Behrends & Christian Starck eds.,
2005).
27. The classification of family law was long unclear; see Wolfram MillerFreienfels, Zur Diskussion um die systematische Einordnung des Familienrechts,37
RABELSZ 609 (1973), 38 (1974) 533; Wolfram Miiller-Freienfels, The Emergence of
Droit de Famille and Familienrecht in Continental Europe and the Introduction of
Family Law in England, 28 J. FAM. HIST. 31 (2003).
28. For debate of whether these norms are "law," see David V. Snyder, Private
Lawmaking, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 371, 403-20 (2003).
29. E.g., FERDINAND KIRCHHOF, PRIVATE RECHTSSETZUNG (1987); STEFFEN AUGSBERG,

RECHTSETZUNG ZWISCHEN STAAT UND

enzierter
ORDNUNG.

GESELLSCHAFT.

des Kapitalmarktes (2003); GREGOR
GRUNDLAGEN ZIVILER REGELSETZUNG (2006).
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7. Jurisdictionof General Courts. A seventh distinction is not jurisprudential but jurisdictional: in Germany, private law matters are
dealt with in ordinary courts, whereas public law matters go to special courts.3 0 Whether an issue belongs to private law or public law is
thus a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction; in turn, the definition of
private law can draw on whether the general courts assert jurisdiction.3 1 In the U.S., by contrast, suits in general courts against the
government have been an important part of the common law for a
long time (although so-called administrative law judges, quasi-judicial agencies established outside the judicial branch, hear many disputes between government agencies and those affected by decisions
of these agencies). 3 2 Thus, the question of jurisdiction creates a difference between Germany and the U.S., but its impact is not absolute, especially regarding the procedural treatment of private and
public law. On the one hand, the German principle of a unitary legal
order (Einheit der Rechtsordnung)3 3 requires like treatment of public
and private law when appropriate, so significant parts of Germany's
procedural law are similar for general and for administrative courts.
On the other hand, public law can trigger special sets of procedure in
the U.S. even though no special public law courts exist.3 4
It should be clear that these concepts, although they overlap (and
it would be interesting to analyze in what ways they are interconnected), must be held apart if debates are to be fruitful. Even more
important for the purpose of this article may be the finding that, although all these differentiations appear both in U.S. and in German
legal discourse, they appear in very different ways. This suggests not
only that Americans and Europeans often mean different things
30. For the history, see Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 11.6. (text accompanying notes 252 et seq.).
31. There are exceptions. For example, although the general courts have jurisdiction over government liability, pursuant to Basic Law, Article 34 (2), such claims are
nonetheless considered part of public law.
32. HAY, supra note 8, at 44, n.92; Ralf Michaels, Gerichtsverfassung und
Verfahrensstrukturen in foderalen Gemeinwesen, 66 RABELSZ 357, 363 (2002).
33. VIELFALT DES RECHTS-EINHEIT DER RECHTSORDNUNG? (Karsten Schmidt ed.,
1994); MANFRED BALDUS, DIE EINHEIT DER RECHTSORDNUNG (1995); DAGMAR FELIX,
DIE EINHEIT DER RECHTSORDNUNG (1998); see also KLAUs F. ROHL, ALLGEMEINE
RECHTSLEHRE 464-69 (1994). But see Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Offentliches Recht

und Privatrecht als wechselseitige Auffangordnungen. Systematisierung und

Entwicklungsperspektiven, in OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND PRIVATRECHT, supra note 11,

261, 272 ("Nicht 'Einheit'sondern Ganzheitlichkeit der Rechtsordnung"-not a 'unitary' but a holistic legal order).
34. L. Harold Levinson, The Public Law/Private Law Distinction in the Courts,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1579 (1989). Levinson defines public law for his purpose as
"any litigation to which a government or a governmental official is a party"; id. at
1580. Whether the courts must, in patent law, defer to legal determinations by administrative agencies (the so-called Chevron doctrine) is said to draw on whether patent law is a matter of administrative law or general private law: Orin S. Kerr,
Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127
(2000).
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when they use a term like private law; it suggests a different understanding in Germany and in the U.S. of law in general and the place
of private law within it. Grossly simplified, in Germany, the core of
the law is private law and the rest is contingent politics;3 5 in the
U.S., the core of the law is public (regulatory) law and the rest is
contingent private ordering.3 6 As a consequence, the difference between private and public law is in Germany largely defined from the
side of private law,3 7 and in American common law from the side of
public law. Public law in Germany appears as that part of the law
that the state makes (other than the mere restatement of private law
in the form of codification). By contrast, private law in the U.S. refers
not to a separate body of law but rather to a private sphere that the
state either willfully grants or in which it must not interfere under
some constitutional or natural-law principles.
Although such a general statement is too broad to apply to every
instance, some examples3 8 may illustrate the thesis. For example,
when Robert Ellickson describes the informal relations and agreements between neighbors as "order without law,"3 9 much of this is,
from a German perspective, law without enforcement-that the
neighbors do not resort to courts or written agreements does not
mean that their relations are not governed by (private) law. Similarly, when Stuart Macaulay describes a number of informal agreements and enforcement measures between business people as "noncontractual relations in business,"40 a German lawyer would view
many of these relations as contracts. It appears that U.S. discourse,
35. This statement has several dimensions. The first dimension concerns the idea
that private law is law, while public law is impure law or even pure politics; see HANS
KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 284-85 (2d ed. 1960) [PURE THEORY OF LAw 281 (2d ed.
Max Knight trans., 1967)]; NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 468-69
(1993) [LAw AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 406 (2004)]. The second dimension concerns the primacy of private law doctrine, which is adapted for public law; see WALTER WILHELM,
ZUR JURISTISCHEN METHODENLEHRE IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT. ZUR HERKUNFT DER
METHODE PAUL LABANDS AUS DER PRIVATRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (2d ed. 2003);
Michaels, supra note 21, nn.63-65. The third dimension concerns the primacy of private law as legal category versus public law as exception. Cf Dieter Grimm, Birgerlichkeit im Recht, in DIETER GRIMM, RECHT UND STAAT IN DER BORGERLICHEN
GESELLSCHAFT 11, 14-15, 27 (1987); Walter Leisner, Unterscheidung zwischen privatem und offentlichem Recht, 61 JURISTENZEITUNG 869, 875 (2006).
36. See also Caruso, supra note 2, at 23-29.
37. With the exception of subject matter jurisdiction (the sixth distinction supra),
which is discussed in administrative law more than in private law.
38. One may object that both examples concern outside perspectives on the law,
from economics and sociology, respectively. We would respond that both examples are
core texts within American legal discourse; that they take an interdisciplinary approach merely reflects the more interdisciplinary character of U.S. legal studies.
39. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
40. Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 55 (1963). Macaulay's definition of contract requires two
elements: "(a) Rational planning of the transaction with provision for as many future
contingencies as can be foreseen, and (b) the existence or use of actual or potential
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in focusing on the enforcement of law, has a more limited concept of
law (especially of private law) than her German colleague to whom
enforcement is not a necessary element of private law.
The main reason is that law and its enforcement are separated in
a much stricter form in Germany than in the common law. This
means that German jurists can focus on the law regardless of its enforcement, making it a true private law detached from the state. By
contrast, in the common law tradition, the partial conflation of law
and enforcement, of rights and remedies, adds at least one necessary
element of "public" law into "private" law: its enforcement.
A second explanation for the difference concerns the respective
role of judges and academics in U.S. and in German private law traditions. German legal science developed in times of frequent changes
of the political landscape; in such a setting, public law was everchanging, while private law was a continuum apt for academic studies. 4 1 By contrast, the common law developed largely in the hand of
judges, who were long more interested in matters of pleading and
procedure than in a coherent underlying substantive private law.
This can also explain why private law plays a lesser role in the
United States in general.
B.

State

There is a third plausible reason why private law has different
roles and meanings in the U.S. and in Germany: the state has a different role and meaning as well. 4 2 With the caveat accompanying all
generalizations, when Germans speak of "the state," they refer to the
comprehensive whole, the collective entity that transcends the particulars. 43 Debates over the law largely take place within the state
framework. By contrast, Americans speak of government rather than
of the state; the idea of the all-encompassing state is far less frequent
in American debates. 44 The distinction is significant: unlike the state,
government is undoubtedly separate from society, and it is also separate from the law. Government may restrict the freedom within society (in a Hobbesian construction) or enable it (in a Lockean
construction), but society could exist without it. By contrast, the idea
legal sanctions to induce performance of the exchange or to compensate for non-performance"; see id. at 56.
41. "Offentliches Recht vergeht, Privatrechtbesteht" [Public Law elapses, Private
Law remains] (Gustav Boehmer). The more frequent version of the quote is "Verfassungsrecht vergeht, Verwaltungsrechtbesteht" [Constitutional law changes, administrative law remains]: Orro MAYER, 1 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT vi (3d ed. 1924).
42. "State" refers to the political institution in general, not to the states within
the United States in particular-in this sense, the United States is a state, too.
43. Cf ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, GESCHICHTE DER RECHTS- UND STAATSPHILOSOPHIE 4-6 (2002).
44. But see Symposium, Changing Images of the State, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1179
(1994).
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that a society requires a state is more plausible, and indeed more
common, in Germany. Similarly, the government is not only separate
from the law but indeed is bound by it, not unlike private citizens. In
the U.S., this means that the government (and its members) can be
sued in the same way (and before the same courts) as private individuals; where they are protected by sovereign immunity, this protection
is based on their functions, not their nature. By contrast, whether
"the state" is bound by the law is a more difficult question-if the
state is all-encompassing, then by definition it encompasses the law

as well. 4 5

Neither the distinction nor its significance should be overrated.
First, the meaning of state and government is ambivalent in both discourses: Germans will sometimes refer to government as state; Americans will sometimes use state in the broader meaning that it has in
German discourse. Second, the distinction is not relevant everywhere: when Germans advocate a weak state and Americans a weak
government, they mean the same thing. Nonetheless, the distinction
is real and has implications on the view of the law's relation to the
state. In German discourse, even where state and law are not synonymous (as they were for Kelsen) 46 they are very close. 4 7 Ideals of law
are discussed under the idea of Rechtsstaat - even terminologically,
the idea of a legal order is bound to the state. 4 8 By contrast, when
American authors call the relation between state and law a perennial
theme, 4 9 they usually refer to European debates. Here, two practical
questions are more important: whether the government is bound by
the law, and whether individuals can appeal to institutions (courts)
for protection of their rights. U.S. discourse has two equivalents to
the German Rechtsstaat reflecting roughly these two issues: the rule
of law (a concept terminologically focused on the government-the
ruler-rather than on the state)5 0 and due process (a concept focused
45. The state can be sued in Germany, too, as a legal person. The idea of "the
state" discussed here goes beyond this legal personality.
46. KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE, supra note 35, at 319-20 [PURE THEORY OF LAW
318-19]. In the U.S., by contrast, synonymy exists between law and rule of law; see
HERMAN FINER, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GOvERNMENT 922 (rev. ed.
1949): "The law and the rule (of law) cover the same ground."
47. See also Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at I.1.
48. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 145 (2d ed. 2004). For
the history of Rechtsstaat, see Ernst W. Bckenfbrde, Entstehung und Wandel des
Rechtsstatsbegriffs, in ERNST W. BOCKENFORDE, RECHT, STAAT, FREIHEIT 143 (1991)
[The Origin and Development of the Concept of the Rechtsstaat, in ERNST W. BOCKENFORDE, STATE, SOCIETY AND LIBERTY 47 (1991)]; Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law
and the Concept of ConstitutionalDemocracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307 1318-29 (2001).
49. EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 52 (1962); see also JOHN CHIPMAN
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 65-83 (2d ed. 1921); Roscoe Pound, Law
and the State. Jurisprudenceand Politics, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1193 (1944).
50. For comparative analyses, see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF
LIBERTY 162-204 (1972); Rosenfeld, supra note 48; Michael Rosenfeld, Constitutional
Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2 INT'L J.
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on protection of the individual against any kind of power). Rechtsstaat is typically confined to "state under the rule of law"; by contrast,
translations of "rule of law" into German (Rechtsstaatsprinzip,
Rechtsstaatlichkeit)are always linked to the state.
What does this mean for the relation between the state and the
private sphere? With all caveats, in Germany, the state was long
viewed not as separate from society but rather as its fulfillment. The
widespread view that German liberalism of the 19th century established a separation of state and society51 can be misleading: It conceals the 19th-century notion of co-originality rather than separation
of state and society; the state was viewed, then and now, as a creation
of society, rather than an antinomy to it.52 More precisely, the socalled separation between state and society signifies in fact a separation between the political sphere and the private spheres of market
and family.5 3 This means that the general idea of the state can remain constant even if the relation between political and private
spheres within the state shifts. The change from the 19th-century liberal state to the 20th-century welfare state concerned not the relationship between society and state, but that between the political and
the private spheres within the state. Both the liberal state and the
welfare state are compatible with the idea, prominent in German
thought, that the state is the general representative of collective concerns. The difference is that the liberal state grants a large sphere of
autonomy while the welfare state interferes more in this sphere for
the greater good, but in both cases the private sphere and its extent
are defined by, and exist within, the state.
The situation is different in the United States, where the state is
contingent on society. The main achievement of the American
Revolution was to get rid of a state (England), and a prime idea beCONST. L. 633, 638-52 (2004); Rainer Grote, Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and Etat de
Droit, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, UNIVERSALISM AND DEMOCRACY. A COMPARATIVE ANALYsis 269 (Christian Starck ed., 1999). Gerald L. Neuman, The U.S. ConstitutionalConception of the Rule of Law and the Rechtsstaatsprinzip of the Grundgesetz, in DAS
GRUNDGESETZ IM PROZESS EUROPAISCHER UND GLOBALER VERFASSUNGSENTWICKLUNG

(Ulrich Battis et al. eds., 2000) focuses, despite its title, almost entirely on U.S. law.
51. For debates of this relation, see, e.g., STAAT UND GESELLSCHAFr (Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde ed., 1976); Hans Heinrich Rupp, Die Trennung von Staat und Gesellschaft, in I HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS § 28 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhoff
eds., 1987).

52. See, e.g., Erich Angermann, Das Auseinandertreten von "Staat" und "Gesellschaft" im Denken des 18. Jahrhunderts,in STAAT UND GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 51,
at 108 (originally in 10/2 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR POLITIK 89 (1963)). Angermann defines the
state as a bureaucratic institution (id. at 112) and society as all non-state group structures (at 113). Under these definitions, state and society are necessarily co-original:
society can only exist if there is a sphere outside the state, and the state under this

definition requires a separate society.
53. Niklas Luhmann, Die Unterscheidung von Staat und Gesellschaft, in
LUHMANN, 4 SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLARUNG 69 (3d ed. 2005); ZUMBANSEN, supra note 21,
at 20-23; see also Dieter Grimm, Der Staat in der kontinentaleuropiischenTradition,
in GRIMM, supra note 35, at 53, 59-60; Stolleis, supra note 11, at 45.
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hind the foundation of individual states and (to a lesser extent) the
Union was to protect the private sphere and private rights. This history may explain the restricted view and function of the state; it may
also provide one explanation why ideals of anarchy and a society
without government and even without state are more common than
in Germany (though of course they still represent a minority view.) 5 4
In a sense, the American view of government is almost the flip-side of
the German view of the state: whereas the German view places particular interests in the members of society and collective interests in
the state, Americans frequently view government as run by special
(particular) interests, while general interests are protected only
within a society free from the state.
These theses, overly broad as they may be, provide a glimpse of
how differently Germans and Americans tend to see the relationship
between the state and private law, a difference that mirrors and reinforces the differences between the relation in each nation of public
and private law. In Germany, the validity of private law is undoubtedly linked to the state, but this in itself has no implications for
whether public or collective concerns play out in private law.5 5 The
state both guarantees freedom and autonomy and protects against
the effects of this freedom, especially on weaker parties; private law
performs both of these tasks simultaneously. In the United States, by
contrast, private law is traditionally viewed as that part of the law
that is separate from the state-the common law that has developed
largely outside the state, in the courts and in society. As a consequence, the state is viewed as a danger to this freedom, at least when
it goes beyond its (allegedly unpolitical) role of enforcing private law.
C.

The Rise of the State and the Decline of Private Law?

The rise of the welfare state in the 20th century challenged the
substantive autonomy of private law from the state both in the U.S.
and in Germany. However, since both private law and state mean
different things in the two systems, this challenge has played out
differently.
In the United States, few would still defend the autonomy of private law; it is commonplace that the public/private distinction is an
(1935); BRUCE L. BENSON, THE
(1990); FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE.
NEW PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS (John T. Sanders & Jan Narveson eds., 1996); see also
MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY & LIBERTY 53-59 (1982). Anarchy goes beyond libertarianism, which sees a minimal role for the state; cf e.g., RICHARD NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 133-37 (1974). It may be more than a terminological
coincidence that these mostly American authors want to abolish or restrict the state
altogether, whereas a former judge at the German Constitutional Court merely wants
to hand it back to society: PAUL KIRCHHOFF, DAs GESETZ DER HYDRA. GEBT DEN BOR54.

E.g., ALBERT JAY NOCK, OUR ENEMY, THE STATE

ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE

(2006).
55. See, in more detail, Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at I.1.

GERN IHREN STAAT ZUROCK!
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illusion. Early in the 20th century, the legal realists dismissed the
traditional view of contract and property as private rights that the
state must accept and enforce as it finds them, and reinterpreted
these rights as public powers vested in rightsholders to engage the

state's help in enforcing their interests. 5 6 This reinterpretation influenced both the political left and the political right.5 7 Critical legal
studies (CLS) scholars made the debunking of the public/private divide a centerpiece of much of their thinking and a cornerstone in
their argument, if not for a strong state, then at least for a treatment
of (apolitical) "private" law as (political) public law.5 8 Conservative
law-and-economics scholars looked at supposedly private law through
public eyes, namely through the eyes of overall welfare maximization.5 9 And they were also critical of the state's role in administering
private law, though their criticism went against the regulatory and
redistributive state, not against the state that provides and enforces
private law.
In this well-known story on the decline of the public/private distinction, four important elements illuminate the peculiar relationship
between private law and the state that underlies much of the debate
and that is relevant to the themes of this article. First, if the underlying concept of private law is that of private ordering, then what is at
stake is not the autonomy but the very existence (or possibility) of
private law so defined. A private law instilled with public considerations, so termed, would be a self-contradiction; this conceptual peculiarity may explain much of the harshness in the debate. Second, the
public/private distinction is not really transcended (in the sense that
each side of the dichotomy is overcome) but rather resolved on the
side of public law: all private law is, "really," public law because it
implies public interests and distributive considerations. 6 0 Third, be56. Robert Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 8 (1927); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933);
both also in MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER, 41, 69 (1982); see also
BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE

ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE

(1998).
57. See now Symposium, ContemporaryPolitical Theory and Private Law, 92

FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT

VA.

L. REV. 1279 (2006).

58. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction,

130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

102-09 (1987).
59. RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 69-76 (1983). See also FRIED-

RICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80-81 (1972).
60. For realists, see MORRIS R. COHEN, LAw AND THE SOCIAL ORDER, supra note

56, at 46 ("property as sovereign power"), 104 (". . . the law of contract may be viewed
as a subsidiary branch of public law"); for Critical Legal Studies, see Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1427-28
(1982); for law and economics, see Gerhard Wagner, Prdvention und Verhaltenssteuerung durch Privatrecht-Anmaiungoder legitime Aufgabe?, 206 ARCHIV FOR DIE
CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIs (AcP) 352, 422-23 (2006). But see Freeman, supra note 22, at

564-65 ("Critical legal scholars, building on legal realism, successfully exposed the
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cause these interests and considerations are located in the state, all
private law is state law; 6 1 the focus lies on its role for the regulatory
state and on the role of adjudication as effective lawmaking. It follows, fourth, that all the different attacks on the public/private divide
come with a certain critique of the role of the state with regard to the
law, be it a critique of its laissez-fare ideology, the superstructure it
provides, or its undue interference with the free interplay of markets.
The left and the right seem to agree not only on private law being on
the political right and public law being on the political left, 6 2 but also
on the crucial role of the state in this debate. The critique of private
law's autonomy presumes a certain role for the state; the critique of
the state's role in private law presumes a certain idea of private law.
In Germany, the public/private divide and its decline have
played out differently. Remarkably, the realists' insight that all private law is public law, because the state necessarily intervenes in
private relations with its decision to enforce or to abstain from enforcement, had been formulated earlier in Germany 63 but with little
effect. 64 The insight had less subversive potential than in the U.S.,
because the realists' credo that "all private law is really public law"
translates, in the German context, into the idea that all private law is
really state law-law made and enforced by the state. This is hardly
more than a truism for the prevailing German view of the relation
between state and law.
In Germany, the debate deals less with the distinction of public
and private spheres and its impact on law than with the distinction
between private and public law. One relevant debate deals with the
role of governmental policies and social values in private law. After
early calls for adding "a drop of socialist oil" to the assumed liberal
structure of the Civil Code6 5 remained at first unheeded, the Third
incoherence of the public/private divide, revealing that a purely private realm exists
only as a legal construct. The flip side of that argument-that a purely public sphere
is also illusory-proves equally true, and has gone relatively unnoticed in administrative law.").
61. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLITIcs 281-84
(1975); Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 835, 836 (1985). ("As long as a state exists and enforces any laws at all, it
makes political choices. The state cannot be neutral or remain uninvolved, nor would
anyone want the state to do so."). What happens if the condition in the beginning of
this sentence is not met?
62. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Political Significance of the Structure of the
Law School Curriculum, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1983). But see, for an attempt to
establish a leftist "new" private law, Symposium, The New Private Law, 73 DENV. U.
L. REV. 993-1279 (1996).
63. E.g., JuLIus BINDER, RECHTSNORM UND RECHTSPFLICHT 27-28, 38-45 (1912);
GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 83 (3d ed. 1914); KELSEN, REINE RECHT-

SLEHRE, supra note 35, at 285-87 [PURE THEORY OF LAw 283-841.

64. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 1.1.
65. The quote is from Orro v. GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS 10
(1889); on the general debate at the time (including similar calls by, e.g., Anton
Menger), see TILMAN REPGEN, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS. EiNE GRUND-
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Reich and the German Democratic Republic attempted to put these
calls into practice by abolishing the distinction between private and
public law, 6 6 with little success. Postwar West Germany took a different path-instead of abolishing the distinction, it enriched traditional private law with substantive values (most notably in consumer
and labor law). Ironically, this strengthened rather than weakened
the autonomy of private from public law-once these values are developed within private law, outside interference from public law becomes unnecessary. At the same time, this means that private and
public law are now able to serve as functional equivalents and mutual residual regimes.6 7 The legislature may choose a private law or a
public law regime to deal with the same problem: accidents, for example, may be dealt with through tort law (arguably private law) or
through insurance schemes (arguably public law), but this functional
equivalence helps maintain the distinction.6 8
A second development concerns the intrusion of Constitutional
basic rights into private law. The idea of "indirect third-party effects"
of the Constitution6 9 gave Constitutional judges a flexible instrument
to instill Constitutional restraints into private law, notably the protection of the weaker party and non-discrimination in contract law.
Although some private lawyers violently oppose these influences out
of concern for the autonomy of private law, 70 others have welcomed it
as a means to fulfill the promises of private law-private autonomy,
FRAGE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION AM ENDE DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS (2001),

reviewed by Viktor Winkler 1 ANNUAL OF GERMAN AND EUROPEAN LAw 540 (2003).

66. MICHAEL STOLLEIs, 3 GESCHICHTE DES OFFENTLICHENS RECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND: STAAT- UND VERWALTUNGSRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT IN REPUBLIK UND DIKTATUR
338-41 [A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY 1914-1945, at 358-62 (2004)]; ZUR
RECHTLICHEN VERANTWORTLICHKEIT, (W. Weichelt ed., 1987); but see also John
Quigley, Socialist Law and Civil Law Tradition, 37 Am. J. COMP. L. 781, 787 (1989)

("Lenin's dictum that all law is public law should not evoke shock.").
67. OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND PRIVATRECHT ALS WECHSELSEITIGE AUFFANGSORDNUNGEN (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem & Eberhard Schmidt-Af3mann eds., 1997).
68. Ralf Michaels, The FunctionalMethod of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD

HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAw 339, 371 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmer-

mann eds., 2006).

69. For comparative analyses, see Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State Action /Hori-

zontal Effect in Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 79 (2003); Stephen W. Gardbaum, The "HorizontalEffect" of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L.

REV. 387 (2003); Mattias Kumm & Victor Ferreres Comella, What is so Special about

ConstitutionalRights in PrivateLitigation?A ComparativeAnalysis of the Functionof

State Action Requirements and Indirect Horizontal Effect, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
PRIVATE RELATIONS. EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM 241 (Andrds Saj6 & Rendta Uitz

eds. 2005); see also Gregor Thiising, Die ,Drittwirkung der Grundrechte"im Verfassungsrecht der Vereinigten Staaten, 99 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSSWISSENSCHAFT 72 (2000).

70. See, e.g., Uwe Diederichsen, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als oberstes
Zivilgericht--ein Lehrstuck fuir die juristische Methodenlehre, 198 AcP 171, 243-56
(1998); see also Jan Smits, Private Law and FundamentalRights: a Skeptical View, in
CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF PRIVATE LAw 9 (Tom Barkhuysen & Siewert Lindenbergh
eds., 2006).
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liberty-in a fuller sense than a libertarian private law could by itself. Indeed, one may doubt whether basic rights are still specifically
public law or whether they are rather fundamental principles that
transcend the public/private distinction and permeate the whole legal
order. 7 '
This creates two differences between Germany and the United
States and one common development. The first difference concerns
autonomy from public law: in the U.S., private law (understood as
private ordering) lost its autonomy by turning into public law; in Germany, private law (understood as contract, tort, and property law)
maintained its autonomy by incorporating public concerns. The second difference concerns the relationship to the state. Whereas critique of private law in the U.S. entails critique of the state that
produces and enforces this law, critique of private law in Germany
takes the state for granted and takes place within it.72 The common
development often goes overlooked: 19th-century private law was
thought to be autonomous from the state: it was conceivable as a
transnational body of law; and indeed, foreign law was frequently
used in private-law adjudication. 7 3 By contrast, when private law
turned into public law or state law, it became domestic law. Now, the
framework for debate and reasoning was the state, and foreign law
was relegated into comparative law, a separate discipline without immediate normative relevance.
III.

DEVELOPMENTS

The traditional views of private law pointed out in Part II are
diverse, but they share certain traits: they all depend on the idea that
private law is part of a coherent legal system owing its validity and
legitimacy to the fact that it is conceived as a coherent whole and
enacted or enabled by the state. This Part describes how recent developments call the traditional view into question. To the extent that the
European Union shapes private law, private law is not the product of
a state, at least in the traditional sense. 7 4 Where private law is created within the plurality of legal orders shaped by globalization, it is
71. This view has long existed in the German discussion; see, THORSTEN HOLLSTEIN, DIE VERFASSUNG ALS "ALLGEMEINER TEIL (2006) (on Hans Carl Nipperdey).
72. See alreadyChristian Joerges, Introduction,in CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: AN
AMERICAN-GERMAN DEBATE 1, 5 (Christian Joerges & David M. Trubek eds., 1989).
73. MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH, ROMAN & CIVIL LAW & THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-

AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997).
74. Europeanization could best be compared to federalization of private law in the
United States. However, apart from the Uniform Commercial Code, the trend has
gone towards defederalization of private law, most importantly through the rejection
of a broad notion of federal common law; see Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at II.5;
Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, "FederalCommon Law" in the European Union:

A Comparative Perspective from the United States, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (2006).
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not the product of one state. When private actors or agencies make
and enforce their own law, this law is not the product of any state.
A.

Europeanization

Europeanization of private law has three different meanings that
sometimes overlap but must be held apart for analysis, since the role
of private law and the state is different in each of them.
1. European Union. One meaning concerns the growing importance of the European Union, 75 which has recently, after originally
dealing with other areas, focused on private law. The view the European Union takes of private law is clearly instrumental-European
private law must serve the common market.7 6 This has different consequences. First, differences between member-state private laws are
said to require supranational harmonization of conflict of laws
rules.7 7 Second, private-law norms of member states can violate E.U.
law if they interfere with the free movement of goods, services, labor,
78
and capital. This is so not only for mandatory norms but even, as
has been argued, for non-mandatory, "truly" private, norms.7 9 Third,
because private law is considered relevant for the functioning of a
common market, the E.U. has begun to harmonize substantial parts
of market-oriented private law through directives.8 0 Some even argue
that differences between the member-state private-law norms require general unification of private law, through either a real codification81 or a legislative instrument sui generis: a common frame of
reference. 82 Defendants of state private law invoke the cultural heri75. See Maarten Vink & Paolo Graziano, Challenges of a New Research Agenda,
in EUROPEANIZATION: NEW RESEARCH AGENDAS 1, 1-26 (Paolo Graziano & Maarten
Vink eds., 2006).
76. See LEONE NIGLIA, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONTRACT IN EUROPE (2003); Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 1.3 et seq.

77. Jurgen Basedow, Spicificit et coordination du droit internationalpriv communautaire, in 2002-2004 TRAVAUX DU CoMiTA FRANQAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PRIvA 275 (2005); on the enhanced role of individual interests over state interests, see

Ralf Michaels, EU Law as PrivateInternationalLaw? Reconceptualizing the Countryof-Origin Principleas Vested-Rights Doctrine, 2 J. PRfv. INT'L L. 195, 238-42 (2006).
78. OLIVER REMIEN, ZWINGENDES VERTRAGSRECHT UND GRUNDFREIHEITEN DES EGVERTRAGES (2003); TORSTEN KORBER, GRUNDFREIHEITEN UND PRIVATRECHT (2004).
79. APoSTOLOs TASSIKAs, DISPOSITIVES RECHT UND RECHTSWAHLFREIHEIT ALS AusNAHMEBEREICHE DER EG-GRUNDFREIHEITEN (2004), criticizing the countervailing view

in Case C-339/89, Alsthom Atlantique v. Compagnie de construction Sulzer SA, 1991

E.C.R. 1-107, no. 15.
80. Peter-Christian Miller-Graff, EC Directives as a Means of Private Law Unification, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 77 (A.S. Hartkamp et al. eds., 3d ed.
2004) with a list of private law directives at 90-100; see also Angus Johnston and
Hannes Unberath, Law at, to or from the Centre? The European Court of Justice and
the Harmonization of Private Law in the European Union, in THE INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 149 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006).
81. For a skeptical overview, see Nils Jansen, European Civil Code, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 247 (Jan Smits ed., 2006) with bibliography.
82. Nils Jansen, Traditionsbegrtindungim europaischenPrivatrecht.Zum Projekt
eines Gemeinsamen Referenzrahmens, 61 JURISTENZEITUNG 536 (2006).
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tage represented in the member states' own private laws or argue
that unification is unnecessary in practice.8 3 Sometimes, U.S. federalism is invoked as a model of non-unified private law, although the
situations are not fully comparable, since similarities of legal cultures and styles between the U.S. states are greater than between
E.U. member states. 84
The impact on private law and the state is ambivalent. On the
one hand, this institutionalized Europeanization reduces the importance of the member states and their private law because they must
yield sovereignty to the European Union. On the other hand, the European Union itself in many ways resembles a state, functionally and
structurally, whether it is called a state or not.8 5 In this sense, institutionalized European private law partly replicates state private law
on a higher level. The result is a system of shared sovereignties and
overlapping private law systems, regardless of whether the European
level is viewed as superior, subordinated, or equal to the state level.
2. TransnationalLegal Science. A second meaning of Europeanization of private law goes beyond the E.U. and refers to European
identity building; it concerns the revival of a pan-European legal science and exchange between judges.8 6 There are several variants of

83.

THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAw: EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL PERSPEC-

TIVES (Jan Smits ed., 2005) (questioning such a need from various perspectives); but

see Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill, The European Community's Competence
to Pursue the Harmonisationof ContractLaw--an Empirical Contribution to the Debate, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR EunoPEAN PRIVATE LAWS, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PRACTICE 105 (Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen

Weatherill eds., 2006) (presenting data on the desire by business for a unified contract law).
84. Ralf Michaels, American Law (United States), in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAw, supra note 81, at 66, 70; see also Mathias Reimann, Amerikanisches Privatrecht und europdische Rechtseinheit-Konnen die U.S.A. als Vorbild
dienen?, in

AMERIKANISCHE RECHTSKULTUR

UND EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT

132

(Reinhard Zimmermann ed., 1995) [American PrivateLaw and EuropeanLegal Unification-Can the United States be a Model?, 3 MAASTRICHT J. EuR. & Comp. L. 217

(1996)1; Richard Hyland, The American Experience: Restatements, the UCC, Uniform
Laws, and TransnationalCoordination,in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, supra
note 80, 59.
85. Christian Joerges, Die Wissenschaft vom Privatrecht und der Nationalstaat,
in RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT IN DER BONNER REPUBLIK 311, 358-59 (Dieter Simon ed.,

1994); Jirgen Habermas, Der europdische Nationalstaat-Zu Vergangenheit und
Zukunft von Souveranitat und Staatsbirgerschaft, in JORGEN HABERMAS, DIE
EINBEZIEHUNG DES ANDEREN 128 (1996) [The European Nation-State:On the Pastand
Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, in JORGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE
OTHER 105 (1998)]; Rainer Wahl, Erkldren staatstheoretische Leitbegrife die
Europdische Union?, 60 JURISTENZEITUNG 916 (2005); see also Cris Shore, 'Government Without Statehood'? Anthropological Perspectives on Governance and Sovereignty in the European Union, 12 Eua. L.J. 709 (2006).
86. NILS JANSEN, BINNENMARKT, PRIVATRECHT UND EUROPAISCHE IDENTITAT 19-22
(2004) with further references. See also Isabelle Petit, Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers
of Europe and the Constructionof a Euro-Identity, 12 Eun. L.J. 661 (2006).
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such an academic "European" private law:8 7 a reinvigorated ius commune as basis of, or model for, an academic transnational private
law,8 8 restatements,89 networks,90 pan-European casebooks, 9 1 and
research on a common core. 9 2 In addition, courts seem more willing
than before to look to the courts of other European states for guidance in private-law cases. 9 3 A widely shared hope is to keep private
law relatively free from instrumental concerns and allow it to maintain its own logic and rationality. Unsurprisingly, E.U. directives are
mostly frowned upon and European codification is widely opposed; if
at all, it should be performed by academics with as little political influence as possible. 94
3. Regulatory Competition. Finally, a third meaning of Europeanization of private law refers not to unification but to greater interde87. For overviews, see Wolfgang Wurmnest, Common Core, Kodifikationsentwirfe, Acquis-Grundsatze-Ansatze von internationalenWissenschaftlergruppen zur
Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung,11 ZEuP 714 (2003); Reinhard Zimmermann, Comparative Law and the Europeanizationof Private Law, in OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 68, at 539.
88. Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny's Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law,
and the Emergence of a EuropeanLegal Science, 112 L.Q. Rev. 576 (1996); REINHARD
ZIMMERMANN, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAW: THE CIVILIAN TRADiTION TODAY (2001); Reinhard Zimmermann, Europa und das romische Recht, 202 AcP
243 (2002); Nils Jansen, Dogmatik, Erkenntnis und Theorie im europdischen Privatrecht, 13 ZEuP 750 (2005).
89. Principles of European Contract Law (Parts I & II rev'd ed. 1998; Part III
2002); "Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law," www.restatement.info;
EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW. TEXT AND COMMENTARY (2005); STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE/CHRISTIAN VON BAR, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW. BENEVOLENT INTERVENTION IN ANOTHER's AFFAIRS (PEL

Ben. Int.) (2006).

90. Joint Network on European Private Law (CoPECL), http://www.copecl.org/;

COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW. STUDIES OF A RESEARCH NETWORK

(Reiner Schulze & Gianmaria Ajani eds., 2003).
91. E.g., Hein Kotz, 1 EUROPAISCHES VERTRAGSRECHT (1996) [1 EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (1997)]; FILIPPO RANIERI, EUROPAISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT (2d ed.
2003); lus Commune Casebook Project, http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/casebook/; for

review articles, see Christoph Schmidt, Anfange einer transnationalenPrivatrechtswissenschaft in Europa, 40 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 213 (1999) [The
Emergence of a TransnationalLegal Science in Europe, 19 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 673
(1999)]; Nils Jansen, Auf dem Weg zu einem europdischen Haftungsrecht, 9 ZEuP 30
(2001).
92. Common Core of European Private Law, http://www.jus.unitn.it/dsgcommoncore/.
93. E.g., Bundesgerichtshof, January 12, 2005, XII ZR 227/03, 162 BGHZ 1, 7-8;
Walter Odersky, Harmonisierende Auslegung und europdische Rechtskultur, 2
ZEuP 1 (1994); Hein Kotz, Der Bundesgerichtshof und die Rechtsvergleichung, in II
50 JAHRE BUNDESGERICHTSHOF. FESTGABE AUS DER WISSENSCHArr 825 (Claus-Wilhelm Canaris et al. eds., 2000); ILKA KLOCKNER, GRENZOBERSCHREITENDE BINDUNG AN
ZIVILGERICHTLICHE PRAJUDIZIEN. MOGLICHKEITEN UND GRENZEN IM EUROPAISCHEN
RECHTSRAUM UND BEI STAATSVERTRAGLICH ANGELEGTER RECHTSVEREINHEITLICHUNG

(2006); Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 1.3 (also for English cases).
94. Roy Goode, The Harmonization of Dispositive Contract and Commercial
Law-Should the European Community be Involved? in DENATIONALISIERUNG DES
PRIVATRECHTS? 18, 28, 31 (Eva-Maria Kieninger ed., 2005).

864

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 54

pendence resulting in regulatory competition.9 5 Proponents hope for
a pluralist private law that is autonomous not only from the state but
also from judicial and academic interventions, a private law created
by, and developing under, the forces of the market. The hypothesis is
that states cannot maintain regulatory laws that are inefficient (as is
often assumed in the area of private law, where many favor market
autonomy over centralized state power), since this would put their
corporations at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis foreign participants and might encourage these corporations to relocate. This competitive effect is intensified by party autonomy in choice of law, which
gives parties the ability to choose the private law applicable to them
and thereby opt out of unfavorable private-law rules. (However, internationally mandatory norms, often the most relevant norms, remain applicable despite a choice by the parties; here, regulatory
competition requires parties to relocate physically.)
These three concepts of Europeanized private law imply very different relations between private law and the state. Proponents of academic Europeanization defend a private law that is largely
independent of instrumental considerations, a private law with its
own logic and rationality. By contrast, the view the European Union
takes of private law is not only instrumental-European private law
must serve the common market-but also bound to the state-like regulatory functions of the E.U. Regulatory competition presupposes an
instrumental private law as well, but with the important difference
that the goals are set not by states or the Union but by the inner
rationality of the market for legal rules. Not surprisingly, the tensions between these views of Europeanized private law are becoming
96
more and more visible.
B.

Globalization

Attempting to define globalization in the abstract would be less
fruitful than identifying where globalization discourse addresses
changes in the role of the state that are relevant for private law.
Many of these developments-supranational regulation, international unification, regulatory competition-bear some similarity to
those under Europeanization. However, since an organization comparable to the E.U. is lacking on the global plane, any concept of global
95. Gerhard Wagner, The Virtues of Diversity in European Private Law, in THE
supra note 83, at 3; Jan Smits, European Private Law: A Plea for a Spontaneous Legal Order,in DEIRDRE M. CURTIN ET AL., EURONEED FOR A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,

PEAN INTEGRATION AND LAW 55, 75-78 (2006); for criticism, see EVA-MARIA KIENINGER,
WETTBEWERB DER PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNGEN IM EUROPAISCHEN BINNENMARKT (2002).

96. Cf Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil Law and Civil Code. The "Europeanization"
of Private Law Within the European Communities and the Re-Emergence of a European Legal Science, 1 COL. J. EUR. L. 63, 73-82 (1994/95); JANSEN, supra note 86, at 6
and passim.
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private law will likely be plural and therefore significantly different
from private law within the state.
1. World State. Many authors think that globalization leads to a
decline of the state,9 7 but this is far from certain. A world state, the
closest analogy to the European Union on a global plane, underlies
two interpretations of globalization in political science. A neo-Kant98
ian interpretation sees a world government without a world state,
legmade up of different supranational branches (the WTO as world
9 9 or of
etc.)
court,
world
as
Justice
of
Court
islator, the International
networks between the different branches of national governmentsone network of legislators, one of judges, etc. 100 This would place the
is faproduction and adjudication of private law in a framework 0that
1 A neostates.
nation
the
with
experience
historical
miliar from
Marxist interpretation holds that the western state will globalize into
a global state or empire10 2 that would resemble the liberal state opposed by Marx, with a clear delimitation of the public and the private

spheres.1 0 3

Such political theories may or may not be convincing: what is
undeniable is that global organizations are in fact exerting pressure
on state private laws. The World Bank, for example, requires developing countries to adopt functioning private-law regimes, frequently
97. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE 336-414 (1999);
but see Achim Hurrelmann et al., Is there a Legitimation Crisis of the Nation State?,
in TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE STATE? 119 (Stephan Leibfried & Michael Zitrn eds.,
2005) (reporting on deeply rooted public support for the nation state).
98. OTFRIED HOFFE, DEMOKRATIE IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG (2d ed.
2002); WELTREPUBLIK. DEMOKRATIE UND GLOBALISIERUNG (Stefan Gosepath & Jean-

Christophe Merle eds., 2002); for critique, see Klaus Ginther, Alles richtig! Otfried
Hoffes Entwurf einer subsidiaren und foderalen Weltrepublik auf der Basis des
Allgemeinmenschlichen, 19 RECHTSHISTORISCHES JOURNAL 232 (2000); Andreas
Fischer-Lescano, Book Review, 89 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 287
(2003).
99. Donald B. King, Does an Unknown World Government Exist? Impact of Commercial and Consumer Law, 22 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 73 (2003); Donald B. King, The
Unknown World Government: Some Very Recent Commercial Law Developments and
Gaps, 23 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 535 (2005); see also Hans Smit, The Universalization
of Private Law, in DE Tous HoRIzoNs. MELANGES XAVIER BLANc-JOuvAN 335, 347-49
(2005); MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, TROIS DtFIS POUR LE DROIT MONDIAL 152 et seq.
(1998).
100. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 262-64 (2004).
101. It is thus the private law side of the call for a global constitution: Jurgen
Habermas, Eine politische Verfassung fur die pluralistische Weltgesellschaft?, in
JURGEN HABERMAS, NATURALISMUS UND RELIGION 324 (2005) [A PoliticalConstitution
for the Pluralist World Society? http://ptw.uchicago.edulHabermas0l.pdfl.
102. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000), esp. at 300-03 (on privatization of public property); MARTIN SHAW, THEORY OF THE GLOBAL STATE (2000); William I. Robinson, Social Theory and Globalization:The Rise of a TransnationalState,
30 THEORY & SOCIETY 157 (2001); see also PARADIGM LOST: STATE THEORY RECONSIDERED (Stanley Aronowitz & Peter Bratsis eds., 2002).
103. For application to law, see Susan Marks, Empire's Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 449 (2003); Antonio Negri, Postmodern Global Governance and The Critical Legal Project, 16 LAW & CRITIQUE 27 (2005).
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modelled after American law, in return for loans. In addition, it has
begun to rank legal systems of all states according to their efficiency-with devastating results for some civil-law countries. 10 4 That
French scholars now protest against the methods involved and invoke the cultural and social values of their national private law 0 5
highlights the tension between global regulation and regulatory competition on the one hand and state control over private law on the
other.
2. Treaties. Absent a world state, the main tool for unifying private law is the treaty. 106 So far, the dream of global private law unification has never been realized. 0 7 Even the most important
international text on private law, the U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), although it treats an intensely international field and is based on extensive preparatory studies in
comparative law, has gained relatively marginal importance in legal
practice and theory. 0 8 Undeterred by such developments, the thenSecretary of UNCITRAL proposed work towards a Global Commercial Code.' 0 9 Whether such a global, relatively uniform private law
can be created without strong global regulatory institutions remains
to be seen.
104.
105.

See http://www.doingbusiness.org.

ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT, LES DROITS DE TRADITION CIVILISTE EN QUESTION. APROPOS DEs RAPPORTs DOING BUSINESS DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE (2006), http:l

www.henricapitant.org/IMG/pdf/Les-droits-de-tradition-civiliste-en-question.pdf,

B8NEDICTE FAUVARQUE-COSSON & SARA PATRIS-GODECHOT, LE CODE CIVIL FACE A SON
DESTIN 152-61 (2006).

106. Juirgen Basedow, Vie Universelle, Droit National?A Propos de la MondialisaTouS HORIZONS, supra note 99, at 223, 229-32.
107. RENE DAVID, THE INTERNATIONAL UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAw (II/5 INT'L ENCYCL. COMP. L.) 123-79 (1971).
tion du Droit, in DE

108. This is true especially for the U.S.: Mathias Reimann, The CISG in the United

States: Why It Has Been Neglected and Why Europeans Should Care, 71 RABELSZ 115
(2007); for a recent overview, see THE DRAFr UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES,
ANALYSIS, AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION (I CILE Studies,

2005). In Europe, there is more case law and academic writing, but many lawyers still
exclude the CISG regularly from international contracts.

109. Gerold Herrmann, The Role of UNCITRAL, in FOUNDATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 28, 35 (Ian Fletcher et al. eds., 2001); Gerold
Herrmann, The Future of Trade Law Unification, 2001 INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT (IHR) 6, 12; see also Michael Joachim Bonell, Do We Need a Global Commercial Code?, 106 DICK. L. REV. 87 (2001) = 5 UNIF. L. REV. 469 (2000); Ole Lando, The
CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles in a Global Commercial Code, in MtLANGES FONTAINE 451 (2003); Ole Lando, A Global Commercial Code, 50 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr (RIW) 161 (2004); Ole Lando, A Vision of a Future World Contract

Law. Impact of European and Unidroit ContractPrinciples,37 UCC L.J. 3 (2004); Ole
Lando, CISG and its Followers:A Proposalto Adopt some InternationalPrinciplesof
Contract Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 379 (2005). The idea was first proposed by
UNIDROIT: Progressive codification of the law of international trade, Note by the
Secretariat of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT), 1968-1970 UNCITRAL Y.B. 285, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970; see
also Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Codificationof the Law of InternationalTrade, 1985 J.
Bus. L. 34.
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3. Regulatory Competition. While these developments could lead
to uniformity, global competition between private law regimes would
require a plurality of private laws. Such competition differs from that
in Europe on a crucial point: an overarching regulatory institution
like the European Union is lacking in the global sphere; regulatory
competition is unregulated.1 1 0 This means that states that are strong
enough can apply their laws extraterritorially and thereby hamper
the possibilities for private parties to opt out of their laws, whether
through party autonomy or through physical relocation. We see this
in the conduct of the U.S. and the E.U., both of which are unwilling
externally to submit themselves to the regulatory competition they
require internally from their respective member states."1 Similarly,
the effect of party autonomy is more dramatic than in the European
Union. On a global level, party autonomy turns the hierarchical relationship between the state and the individual upside down. In the
traditional view, the individual is subordinated to the state, even in
the realm of private law. By contrast, party autonomy subordinates
the state and its private law to private parties and their choices. Parties are not confined to using the autonomy granted to them by the
legal order; rather, they have the autonomy to choose the very legal
order that grants this autonomy. All of this means that global private
law will likely remain pluralistic and non-hierarchical, an important
difference to a hierarchical state-based private law.
4. Americanization. Competition between private laws does not
necessarily occur on a level playing field, for better or worse. If stu12
dents of globalization often speak of "the state," this is too general.1
Arguably, globalization strengthens big powerful states like the
1 1 3 In
United States (and the E.U.), while weakening midsize states.
accordance with this view, some view globalization as an increased
110. Although the World Trade Organization is sometimes equated to the European Union, its impact is far smaller; this is true in particular with regard to private
law. See also Josef Drexl, WTO und Privatrecht,in VEREINHEITLICHUNG UND DIVERSITAT DES ZIVILRECHTS IN TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRAUMEN 333-64 (Claus Ott
& Hans-Bernd Schafer eds., 2002); Christian Joerges, Constitutionalism in Postnational Constellations:ContrastingSocial Regulation in the E.U. and in the WTO, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SocIAL. REGULATION 491
(Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Ptersmann eds., 2006).

111. For the E.U., see Case C-381/98, Ingmar v. Eaton Leonard, 2000 E.C.R. 1-9305
(mandatory application of E.U. law on commercial agency contracts); Ralf Michaels &
Hans-Georg Kamann, Grundlagen eines allgemeinen gemeinschaftlichen Richtlinienkollisionsrechts-"Amerikanisierung" des Gemeinschafts-IPR?, 12 EUROPAISCHES
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERRECHT 301, 311 (2001); STEPHANIE FRANCQ, L'APPLICABILITi
SPATIALE DU DROIT DIRIV8 COMMUNAUTAIRE AU REGARD DES MITHODES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV (2005); Basedow, supra note 106, at 229-32.

112. Ralf Michaels, Welche GlobalisierungfUr das Recht? Welches Recht fir die
Globalisierung?,69 RABELsZ 525, 532 (2005).
113. Globalization can strengthen also small states, since it enables them to derive
disproportionate revenues from lucrative transnational business like banking or registration of offshore corporations.
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Americanization of the law in the world, including private law.11 4
Some private-law projects in Europe can be viewed as a reaction; they
aim, implicitly or explicitly, at protecting European private law with
its social aspects against such Americanization,1 15 while at the same
time promoting European (and German) private law as a model for
other states. If globalization weakens the power of mid-size states,
then both the strengthening of the European Union and the Europeanization of private law can be viewed as reactions to globalization.11 6 The tension between U.S. and German private law is then
also a tension over the role of specific states in private law, not just of
the state in the abstract.
C. Privatization
All these developments concern the shift of state power to other
states or global institutions. Yet, perhaps the most important development of globalization is the shift away from states altogether towards the private sphere. In a globalized world, in addition to states,
an increasing number of non-state institutions-NGOs, multinational corporations, and individuals-are relevant international or
transnational actors. 1 17 In various ways and degrees, these have all
become not only subjects and objects of international law, but also
creators and shapers of law. Since these organizations are private,
the resulting law is a kind of privatized private law that is independent from the state to the extent that the state does not interfere and
is not required for its enforcement.
1. TransnationalLegal Science. One consequence could be the
emergence of a transnational legal science with a global academic debate and a worldwide community of courts. While some such developments can be observed in the human rights sector, 1 8 similar
developments in private law are made more difficult by the relative
lack of common intellectual and cultural roots worldwide; even com114. Michaels, supra note 84, at 73-74 with further references; Duncan Kennedy,
Three Globalizationsof Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEw LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT. A CRITIcAL APPRAISAL 19, 63-71 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds.,
2006). But see Mathias Reimann, Droitpositifet culture juridique. L'ambricanisation
du droit par reception, 45 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT - L'AMRICANISATION
DU DROIT 61 (2002).
115. Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now (2002), http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/
iss1/artl/; Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in
European Contract Law: A Manifesto, 10 Eua. L.J. 653 (2004).
116. Sjef van Erp, Editorial-EuropeanPrivate Law and Legal Globalisation,6.2
ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (2002), http://www.ejcl.org/62/editor62.html.
117. There are also hybrid institutions between state and private actors; for the
banking sector, see Janet K. Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to InternationalLawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2005);
Michael S. Barr & G. P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17
EUR. J. INT'L L. 15 (2006).
118. See Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 1.3.
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munication between German and U.S. law is sometimes riddled with
misunderstandings.' 1 9 Nonetheless, one such development is occurring in the area of commercial law, in the form of academic restatements or private codifications of private law. Modelled after both
European national codifications and the American Restatements,
several different and sometimes competing private codifications exist
on the global level.12 0 Whereas European private codifications offer
themselves, at least in part, as models for a possible future European
codification and thus for incorporation into the political system,
worldwide models remain permanently outside the structure of
states. They serve either as mere academic constructions or as potentially applicable law for international contracts, most importantly (up
until now) in arbitration. 12 1 Formally similar to "official" codifications but lacking a legislator's authority, they present a challenge to
traditional concepts of private law: their character as "law" is disputed; their functions oscillate between potential and actual description and prescription.1 2 2
2. Privately Created Orders. More controversial is the idea of privately created legal orders.1 23 Although various kinds of such orders
are often presented indiscriminately, closer analysis identifies these
orders as reflections of four different themes of globalization. The primacy of economy and markets, a favorite globalization topic, is reflected in the idea of a new lex mercatoria (law merchant), a
transnational body of substantive rules created not by states but by
the needs and practices of commerce and applied and developed by
international arbitration.12 4 A second globalization theme, technolog119. On an earlier U.S.-German project, see Christian Joerges, On the Context of
German-American Debates on Sociological Jurisprudence and Critique of Law: A
TransatlanticRecord of Misunderstandingsand Missed Opportunities,1993 EuR. YB.
Soc. OF LAW 403.
120. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004, http://
www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm; see also supra notes 89, 109.
121. MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT
LAW 273-300 (3d ed. 2005); but see supra note 109.
122. Ralf Michaels, Privatautonomie und Privatkodifikation. Zu Anwendbarkeit
und Geltung allgemeinerVertragsrechtsprinzipien,62 RABELsZ 580, 584-91 (1998); see
also Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles"und der "Principles of European ContractLaw" im System der Rechtsquellen, in EUROPAISCHE VERTRAGSRECHTSVEREINHEITLICHUNG UND DEUTSCHEs RECHT 5 (Jiurgen Basedow ed.,
2000).
123. Cf supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
124. Peer Zumbansen, Lex mercatoria: Zum Geltungsanspruch transnationalen
Rechts, 67 RABELsZ 637 (2003) [Piercing the Legal Veil: CommercialArbitration and
TransnationalLaw, 8 EUR. L.J. 400 (2002)]; CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY. TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL EcONOMr
(2003); RULES AND NETWORKS. THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 159 et seq. (Richard P. Appelbaum, William L.F. Felstiner & Volkmar Gessner

eds., 2001); Symposium, The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law
Merchant, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004); Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria,IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming). See also Julian D.M. Lew, Achieving the Dream:
Autonomous Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT'L. 179 (2006).
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ical advances and the rise of the internet, corresponds to the conceptualization of private law created within the internet community.12 5
A third group of private laws substitutes community trust created by
26
close religious or ethnic ties for the state's enforcement scheme'
and thereby exemplifies a move in globalization from territoriality to
community affiliation.12 7 A fourth group, finally, contains private legal orders that are specific to certain functional sectors of world society; they reflect the move towards global functional systems:12 8 a
transnational sport law (lex sportiva),1 29 a transnational construction
law (lex constructionis),13 0 etc.
Both the existence and the legal character of all these orders are
disputed. Much of the debate is inconclusive: it confounds conceptual
analysis with questions of validity and legitimacy, and throws together issues of general acceptance, legal validity, intrinsic quality,
and of definition. Obviously, privately created private law can only be
called "law" if the concept of law is not confined to state-created or31
ders; whether such a definition is useful depends on the context.'
125. Gillian Hadfield, DeliveringLegality on the Internet: Developing Principlesfor
the Private Provision of Commercial Law, 6 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 154 (2004).
126. Often, old normative orders outside the state receive new attention. One example is Shariah (understood as a modern transnational law); another is the Chinese
institution of Guanxi (personalized networks of influence). See JANET T. LANDA,
TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY (1994); RULES AND NETWORKS. THE LEGAL CULTURE
OF GLOBAL BUSINESS

TRANSACTIONS, supra note 124, at 325-402. Another example

concerns the norms and dispute regulations established by orthodox Jews in the international diamond trade; see Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal ContractualRelations in the Diamond Industry, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992);
Barak Richman, How Communities Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond
Merchants in New York, 31 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 383 (2006).
127. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalizationof Jurisdiction,151 U. PA. L. REV. 311
(2002).
128. MATHIAS ALBERT, ZUa POLITIK DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT. IDENTITAT UND RECHT
IM KONTEXT INTERNATIONALER VERGESELLSCHAFTUNG (2002); see also Ralf Michaels,
US-Gerichte als Weltgerichte-Die Avantgarde der Globalisierung,31 DAJV-NEwSLETTER 46, 49-50 (2006).
129. Mark van Hoecke, Des ordres juridiques en conflit: sport et droit, 35 REVUE
INTERDISCIPLINAIRE D'ETUDES JURIDIQUES (R.I.E.J.) 62 (1995); Gerald Simon, Existe-t-il
un ordrejuridique du sport?, 33 DRoITs 97 (2001); Jens Adolphsen, Eine lex sportiva
fir den internationalenSport?, in 2002 JAHRBUCH JUNGER ZIVILRECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLER 281 (2003); Thomas Schultz, La lex sportiva se manifeste auxjeux olympiques de
Turin: Suprimatie du droit non Otatique et boucles 6tranges (2006), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=896673; FRANOIs OsT & MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE, DE LA PYRAMIDE AU
RESEAU? POUR UNE THIPORIE DIALECTIQUE DU DROIT 202-20 (2002).
130. ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO & GUNTHER TEUBNER, REGIME-KOLLISIONEN. ZUR
FRAGMENTIERUNG DES GLOBALEN RECHTS 101-10 (2006).
131. Many opinions are more absolute. Legal pluralists insist that restricting the
notion of "law" to state law is unacceptable; e.g., BRIAN TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 192 (2001). Opponents insist that definitions must
include the state if they are to have any explanatory power; see Simon Roberts, After
Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68 MOD. L. REV. 1, 13-17 (2005)
For a thorough analysis, pointing out that the answer depends on the purpose for
which law is to be determined, see Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who's Afraid of Legal
Pluralism?,47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 37, 39-42 (2002); see also Ralf Michaels, The Re-

State-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law and the Challenge from Legal
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More important is the actual relation of these private orders to
the state, especially the question whether they provide the applicable
norms in a choice-of-law analysis.132 Traditionally, states have been
unanimous in rejecting the applicability of non-state private laws in
choice of law; 3 3 demands to the contrary 3 4 have so far remained unheeded. This attitude may be changing at least for quasi-official private codifications: a recent proposal for a European regulation on
choice of law in contracts would allow parties to choose private codifications like the UNIDROIT Principles over state law as the law applicable to their contracts.' 3 5 This would be a triumph for privately
made, non-state law, which could achieve an equal footing with statemade private law. However, it would also be a victory (not yet realized by all) for state-made private law as the model for what can be
accepted as law: privatized private law will only be recognized when
it appears as a code, sufficiently similar, in form and substance, to
state law.
D.

The Decline of the State and the Rise of Private Law?

What broader effects do these developments have for private
law? Harold Koh convincingly argues that what he calls transnational legal process "breaks down two traditional dichotomies that
have historically dominated the study of international [and, one could
add, domestic] law: between domestic and international, public and
private."136 However, whereas Koh follows the legal realists' example' 3 7 and breaks the dichotomy for the benefit of a broadened conPluralism,51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1224-27, 1258-59 (2005). A yet unresearched question is whether there is a parallel between state-based conceptions of law and an emphasis on public law on the one hand, and between non-state-based conceptions of law
and an emphasis on private law on the other hand.
132. Michaels, supra note 131.
133. For lex sportiva, see OLG Frankfurt/M., 18 April 2001, 2001 SPORT uND RECHT
(SPURT) 159; Bundesgericht, Dec. 20, 2005, 132 BGE II 285 (Switz.) [English summary in 11 Unif. L. Rev. 420 (2006)1; for Shari'ah,see Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v.
Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2004) EWCA Civ. 19; see also Michaels, supra note
131, at 1228-31.
134. E.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws:
Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1819 (2005);
GABRIELE SCHERER, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT ALS GLOBALES SYSTEM (Diss.

HU Berlin 2005), available at http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/docviews/abstract.php?lang=
ger&id=26355.
135. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 final, p. 5 and
Article 3(2) (advocating choice of non-state law for contracts in the European Union).
The provision has been deleted in the Proposal of the Finnish and German Council
Presidency of Dec. 12, 2006, 16353/06 JUSTCIV 276 CODEC 1485. For U.S. law on
this question, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Contracts Subject to Non-State Norms, 54
AM. J. Comp. L. (SUPPL.) 209, 215-31 (2006); see also Friedrich K. Juenger, Contract
Choice of Law in the Americas, 45 AM. J. Comp. L. 195, 204-05 (1997).
136. Koh, supra note 1, at 184; similarly BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS

A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 83-84 (2d ed. 2002).

137. Supra note 60.
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cept of public law, it may be more plausible to turn the realist project
on its head and break the dichotomy on the other side: In the domestic sphere, all law may really be public; in the global sphere, all law
is, arguably, really private.1 3 8 The legal realists had to assume, tacitly, that the state is strong enough to regulate all ostensible private
law as public law. To view the abstention from intervening in the
1 3 9 makes
private sphere as a form of regulation, as Robert Hale did,
sense only when this abstention is the result of a political (public)
decision, not of inability. Yet inability is exactly what globalists now
argue characterizes the state: states are so weak, compared to other,
non-state actors on the world scene, that they yield much of their sovereign power to the forces of the market-regulatory competition,
public-private partnerships, privatization, etc. 14 0 All domestic law
may become public law, but all international law becomes transnational private law.141 It is especially the relative independence from
government traditionally enjoyed by private law that makes it a
likely candidate for the supranational situation without a
government.
Such a rebirth of autonomous private law is reminiscent of the
autonomous private law of 19th-century liberalism, but it differs in a
crucial way. Then, the autonomy was possible because a strong state
was willing and able to grant this autonomy.14 2 Now, the monolithic
state that could grant this autonomy has given way to a multitude of
public and private actors, and the new autonomy of private law takes
place not in the presence and under the protection of a state but
rather in, and due to, its absence. This makes the idea that private
law can remain essentially unchanged both implausible and unattractive. That private law could remain essentially free of "public"
values has always been an illusion, but it had at least a grain of plausibility when the provision of such values and control could be exter138. See Thomas Wilhelmsson, Welfare State Expectations, Privatisationand Pri-

vate Law, in FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STATE EXPECTATIONS, PRIVATISA-

TION AND PRIVATE LAW 3, 23-25 (Thomas Wilhelmsson & Samuli Hurri eds., 1999). On

the debate about an autonomous public international law, see Benedict Kingsbury,
The Problem of the Public in Public InternationalLaw, 49 NOMOS (forthcoming).
139. Supra note 56.
140. Mark Freedland, Government by Contract Re-examined: Some Functional Issues, in LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CAROL HARLOW

123 (Paul Craig & Richard Rawlings eds., 2003).

141. The literature on this question is expansive. For two critical analyses, see

Klaus Ginther, (Zivil-)Recht. Kann das Zivilrecht im Zuge der Globalisierung das
offentliche Recht ersetzen?, in RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT. RECHT-FERTIGUNG
ZWISCHEN

PRIVATRECHTSDOGMATIK

UND

GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE

295

(Christian

Joerges & Gunther Teubner eds., 2002); Christoph Mollers, Transnational Governance without a Public Law? in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

329 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004).
142. This in turn represented an inheritance of earlier times when private law had
been largely beyond the reach of public domination; Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4.
See also Michaels, supra note 131, at 1236-37.
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nalized to the state and to public law. Such externalization has now
become more difficult. In the European Union, the task of providing
"social values" can be assigned from the member states to the E.U.
level, or vice versa, from the E.U. to the member states.143 On a
global level, since there is no state to provide essentially "public" values, it is unclear where the public values to enrich and legitimize
private law should originate. 14 4
This does not mean that globalized private law cannot contain
any values beyond those of the market. Perhaps, the new private law
must develop the necessary values within itself, as genuine private
law values. Along these lines, proposals have been made to constitutionalize global private law-not in the traditional sense of constraints from an external (state) constitution, but rather, in
accordance with the idea of a constitution beyond the state,14 5 in the
sense that private law must itself turn into a constitutional order.146
Whether globalized private law can develop the necessary values
within its own rationality is perhaps the most pressing question.
IV.

ISSUES

It should have become clear that private law requires rethinking,
especially with regard to its connection to the state. That being so,
much of our traditional conception of private law is called into question: its validity as an enactment of the state or a national tradition,
its method as a coherent and hierarchical structure, its legitimacy
through democratic enactment or as an embodiment of private rights
protected by the state, its autonomy as a distinct branch of law.
143. See, from the vast literature, Study Group on Social Justice, supra note 115;
Fernanda Nicola, Another View on European Integration:Distributive Stakes in the
Harmonization of European Law, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND
MARKETS: RETHINKING IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY (Clare Dalton & Dan Danielsen eds.,
forthcoming); Rasmus Goksor, Jurisprudenceon Protectionof Weaker Partiesin European Contracts Law: A Swedish and Nordic Perspective, 6 CHI.-KENT J. OF INT'L &
Comp. L. 184 (2006); see also Ugo Mattei & Fernanda Nicola, A "Social Dimension" in

European Private Law? The Call for Setting a Progressive Agenda, 41 NEw ENG. L.

REV. 1 (2006).
144. John Wightman, Private Law and Public Interests, in FROM DISSONANCE TO
SENSE, supra note 138, at 253, 257-66; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms
through Privatization,116 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1314-52 (2003); Laura Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 384 (2006); see also ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 17-18 (1996) (advocating a public-law structure in private relationships).

145. Gunther Teubner, Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie, 63 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND OFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1 (2003) [Societal Constitutionalism:Alternatives to StateCentred Constutional Theory?, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERN-

ANCE 3 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004)]; see also ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO,
GLOBALVERFASSUNG (2003).

146. Christian Joerges, European Challengesto PrivateLaw: on False Dichotomies,
True Conflicts and the Need for a Constitutional Perspective, 18 LEGAL STUD. 146
(1998).
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These issues-validity, method, legitimacy and autonomy of globalized law-are frequently debated with regard to globalization, but
typically with a focus on public law. This section highlights the special role of private law with regard to these issues and proposes structures for addressing these issues.
A.

Validity

The first question is central especially to German legal thinking:
what counts as valid private law. Three concepts must be distinguished: 14 7 juridical validity requires issuance in the duly prescribed
way by a duly authorized organ; sociological validity requires that
law is effectively obeyed and enforced; ethical validity requires that
law is morally justified. Juridical validity of law, including private
law, has traditionally been based on the state's authority: even if the
state does not create the substance of private law, it is law only because the state accepts it as such. 14 8 This poses obvious problems
when private law moves beyond the state.14 9
1. Sociological Validity. One answer is to substitute sociological
or ethical for juridical validity. Legal pluralists suggest that we recognize privately made norms as law because of their sociological effectiveness. This suggestion is not entirely new-historically, nonstate normative orders have long posed a challenge to the state.' 5 0
Nor does it necessarily lead to radically different outcomes-states
have always effectively recognized non-state normative orders even
though they denied them the character of "law," notably through incorporation, deference, and delegation.' 5 ' What makes this answer
radical is the suggestion to give up the traditional concept of juridical
validity and replace it with sociological validity. This has always been
perceived as risky, as is evidenced by the historical desire in centuries past to find for the law's validity a juridical criterion of authority
beyond effectiveness and correctness, however fictional.1 52 One reason is that social effectiveness is difficult to determine empirically. In
addition, to consider a norm legally binding because it is practically
effective requires a problematical is/ought crossover.
2. Ethical Validity. Other authors propose a quasi-natural concept of private law beyond the state, based on practical reasoning and
147. ROBERT ALEXY, BEGRIFF UND GELTUNG DES RECHTS 139-43 (4th ed. 2002) [THE
ARGUMENT FROM INJUSTICE. A REPLY TO LEGAL POsITvism 85-88 (Stanley L. Paulson
& Bonnie Litschewski-Paulson trans., 2004)]; see also OsT & VAN DE KERCHOVE, supra
note 129, at 324-41.
148. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at I.1.
149. Michaels, supra note 122, at 612-22.
150. See, e.g., Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 11.2 (lex mercatoria).
151. Michaels, supra note 131, at 1231-37.
152. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 11.3.
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moral principles, 15 3 and thereby suggest effectively substituting ethical for juridical validity. Such an idea of reasoning underlies not only
some proposals for a new ius commune; arguably, a similar idea is
implicit in proposals for a global private law based on economic efficiency or global utility maximization as objective goals. Although economics and natural law have vastly different values, both agree that
law should be shaped by objective values extrinsic to the lawmaker's
description. If private law is autonomous from political considerations, then dispensing with juridical validity may be less problematical than for public law, where a disentanglement of validity from the
political process appears more unattractive. Whether private law is,
or should be, autonomous in this sense is a different and prior
question.
3. Rethinking Juridical Validity. Another answer is not to replace juridical validity but to rethink it. If juridical validity is defined
through issuance in the duly prescribed way by a duly authorized organ, then it is not necessarily tied to the state-supranational or nonstate organs may be duly authorized as well. However, the criterion
of a duly authorized organ raises an immediate follow-up question,
both within and outside the state: According to what standard is the
organ duly authorized? And how does this standard in turn achieve
validity? Obviously, juridical validity leads into infinite chains ofjustification. There are three ways to break such chains: they can be
continued into infinity; they can be broken at some point where a
foundation is simply assumed as an axiom; or they can become
circular.154

Can the chain of justification for private law be continued into
infinity? While infinite reasoning is logically impossible, a fiction of
infinity is frequently found. The common law, at least in its English
version, adopts a variant when its validity is based on tradition since
time immemorial. 15 5 Similarly, when the justification for a new ius
commune is sought in the long European intellectual tradition, this is
based on the fiction of an infinite chain of justification.
More frequent are attempts to break the chain of justification at
one point that is used as an axiom. For state private law, this axiom
lies typically in the state-in either a Kelsenian Grundnorm or a
Hartian rule of recognition. However, there is no good reason why the
only Grundnorm or rule of recognition should exist within the state153.

PETER JAGGI, PRIVATRECHT UND STAAT. GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE 3-84 (1976);
JURIs. 1 (2002).

James Gordley, The Moral Foundationsof Private Law, 47 Am. J.

154. This is the famous Minchhausen trilemma: HANS ALBERT, TRAKTAT OBER
15-17 (5th ed. 1991) [TREATISE ON CRITICAL REASON 18-21

KRITISCHE VERNUNFr

(1985)].
155. Under English common law, customs could be recognized as law if they had
existed since "time immemorial." Although this appears to represent an infinite chain
ofjustification, in fact the chain was broken more or less arbitrarily for the year 1189
by the English Statute of Westminster in 1275.
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especially for private law, which is already relatively independent
from the state. For Europe, some have already argued for an interplay of two Grundnorms-one of the European Union, the other of
the member states. 15 6 Moreover, once we establish the Grundnorm
as a mere analytical tool, there is no intrinsic reason why it should be
confined to traditional states.1 5 7 The same is true for Hartian rules of
recognition. If legal pluralists are correct in stating that people owe
allegiance to numerous different normative orders, this suggests the
existence of various rules recognition that can validate both state and
non-state laws.15 8 The result is a situation with multiple overlapping
private law orders, arguably not an inadequate conceptualization of
global private law.
Finally, circular chains of justification are gaining new attraction
for globalization. Autopoietic theory holds that law, in particular private law, is able to create and maintain itself through a self-recurring, autopoietic process.' 5 9 This process gains special force for nonstate law. Since autopoietic theory makes it possible to conceive of
various legal orders that establish themselves outside the state, it
has, not surprisingly, welcomed globalization discourse (albeit typically under the heading of world society).16 0 The law is no longer con156. For the possibility of multiple Grundnorms or rules of recognition, see NEIL
MCCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY-LAw, STATE AND PRACTICAL REASON (1999);

N.W. Barber, Legal Pluralism and the European Union, 12 EuR. L.J. 306 (2006); see
also Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Monismus, Dualismus? Pluralismus. Selbstbestimmung des Weltrechts bei HansKelsen und Niklas Luhmann, in VOLKERRECHTSPOLITIK.
HANS KELSENS STAATSVERSTANDNIS (Hauke Brunkhorst ed., forthcoming); Theodor

Schilling, On the Value of a PluralisticConcept of Legal Ordersfor the Understanding
of the Relation Between the Legal Orders of the European Union and its Member
States, 83 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 568 (1997).

157. See Alexander Somek, Staatenloses Recht: Kelsens Konzeption und ihre

Grenzen, 91 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 61 (2005) [Stateless Law.

Kelsen's Conception and its Limits, 26 Ox. J. LEGAL STuD. 753 (2006)]; for connections
between Kelsen and autopoietic theory, see Frangois Ewald, The Law of Law, in
AuTOPOIETIc LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 36, 39-41 (Gunther Teubner

ed., 1988).
158. But see Massimo La Torre, Legal Pluralism as Evolutionary Achievement of
Community Law, 12 RATIO Juals 182 (1999) (arguing that legal pluralism in the E.U.
requires a single rule of recognition).
159. Gunther Teubner, et al., The Autonomy of Law: An Introduction to Legal
Autopoiesis, in INTRODUCTION TO JURISPDUDENCE AND LEGAL THEORY. COMMENTARY

AND MATERIALS, ch. 19 (Richard Nobles & David Schiff eds., 2003).

160. Gunther Teubner, Globale Bukowina: Zur Emergenz eines transnationalen

Rechtspluralismus, 15 RECHTSHISTORISCHES JOURNAL 255 (1996) [Global Bukowina:
Legal Pluralism in the World-Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther

Teubner ed., 1996)]; Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames:Economic Globalisationand
the Emergence of lex mercatoria, 45 Am. J. COMP. L. 149 (1997); Gunther Teubner,
Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous
Sectors?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 71 (Karl-Heinz

Ladeur ed., 2004); Gralf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive TransnationalLaw: The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisationof PrivateLaw, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 185 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=531063; Marc Amstutz &

Vaios Karavas, Rechtsmutation. Zu Genese und Evolution des Rechts im transnationalen Raum, 8 RECHTSGESCHICHTE 14 (2006).
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ceived as a hierarchical structure; rather, different legal systems
interact in a network.161 At the same time, this theory, based in sociology, may be open to the same criticism as the criterion of social
effectiveness-an is/ought crossover.
B. Method
If private law is plural, this poses challenges for our methods,
many of which have been developed in the context of state private
law. A debate has begun on whether these methods are still appropriate for private law beyond the state, especially in the European context, 162 but much remains to be done.
1. Beyond Domestic Law. A first challenge to traditional methods
goes against their domestic character-not only in Germany, where
the highest methodological criterion is typically the legislature's real
or hypothetical will, but also in the U.S., where the common law is
viewed as the expression of a sovereign's will rather than a pie in the
transnational sky. This domestic focus must obviously be adapted for
binding supranational law. Especially in Europe, this presents challenges regarding the relationship and manifold conflicts between
E.U. and national private law.16 3 However, even beyond such supra161. OST & VAN DE KERCHOVE, supra note 129; see also Gunther Teubner, The
King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy, 31 L. & Soc. 763
(1997).
162. Reiner Schulze, Ein Jahrhundert BGB-deutsche Rechtseinheit und
europiisches Privatrecht,75 DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG 369 (1997) [A Century of the
Birgerliches Gesetzbuch: German Legal Uniformity and European Private Law, 5
COL. J. EuR. L. 461 (1999)]; Juirgen Basedow, Anforderungen an eine europaische
Zivilrechtsdogmatik, in RECHTSGESCHICHTE UND PRIVATRECHTSDOGMATIK 79 (Reinhard Zimmermann, Rolf Kntitel & Jens Peter Meincke eds., 1999); THoMAs M.J. MoLLERS, DIE ROLLE DES RECHTS IM RAHMEN DER EUROPAISCHEN INTEGRATION. ZUR
NOTWENDIGKEIT EINER EUROPAISCHEN GESETZGEBUNGS- UND METHODENLEHRE (1999)
[THE ROLE OF LAW IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. IN SEARCH OF A EUROPEAN IDENTITY

(2003) (a short version can be found in 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 679 (2000))]; Ernst A.
Kramer, Konvergenz und Internationalisierungder juristischen Methode, in DIE
ZUKUNFT DES RECHTs 71 (Christian J. Meier-Schatz ed., ZSR-Beiheft 28, 1999); Arndt
Teichmann, Die ,Europiisierung des Zivilrechts" und ihre Auswirkungen auf die
Hermeneutik, in FESTGABE ZIVILRECHTSLEHRER 1934/1935, 629 (Walther Hadding ed.,

1999); Klaus-Peter Berger, Auf dem Weg zu einem europiischen Gemeinrecht der

Methode, 9 ZEuP 4 (2001); UNTERSCHIEDLICHE RECHTSKULTUREN-KONVERGENZ DES
RECHTSDENKENS (Heinz-Dieter Assmann et al. eds., 2001); Axel Flessner, Juristische
Methode und europaischesPrivatrecht,57 JURISTENZEITUNG 14 (2002); Axel Flessner,
Europiisches Privatrecht und bewegliches System, 125 JURISTISCHE BLATTER 205

(2003); Stefan Vogenauer, Eine gemeineuropiische Methodenlehre des RechtsPladoyer und Programm, 13 ZEuP 234 (2005); Ernst A. Kramer, Nationale Privatrechtskodifikationen, internationale Privatrechtsvereinheitlichungund Privatrechtsvergleichung zu Beginn des neuen Jahrhunderts, 124
SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 1.421 (2005); Jansen, supra note

ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
88; EUROPAISCHE

METHODENLEHRE. GRUNDFRAGEN DER METHODEN DES EUROPAISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS

(Karl Riesenhuber ed., 2006).
163. E.g., Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of
PrivateLaw: A Plea for a New Discipline, 14 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT'L L. 149 (2004);

Marc Amstutz, Zwischenwelten: Zur Emergenz einer interlegalenRechtsmethodik im
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national law, scholars argue that the interdependence among states
and their legal systems makes the use of comparative law
mandatoryl 6 4-not only for harmonized law in the European Union,
but in general. This use can rest on an (implicit) assumption that a
pan-European, or even global, private law exists; 6 5 but even a pluralist conception of global private law requires exchange.
2. Coherence. Another issue concerns the question of coherence of
legal systems, dear to German private law in the 19th and 20th centuries,16 6 but far less important in the United States.' 6 7 Some consider systematic private law irreconcilable with the ethical pluralism
of our postmodern time.' 6 8 Yet, the opposite view seems at least
equally plausible: only a systematic and coherent law can mediate
between the otherwise irreconcilable and incommensurable ethical
positions of our pluralist society. 6 9 National societies were hardly
more coherent in the 19th century, the age of codification and systematic legal thought, than today's global society. One difference was
that states were able to bring coherence through their highest courts;
this was true for England since the late 12th century and for Germany in the 19th. 170 However, the absence of central courts beyond
the state does not rule out the creation of coherence altogether.171
One possibility is codification, in the form of treaties or an official
global commercial code,1 72 or, following the model of Restatements in
the U.S., in the form of unofficial restatements that try to create the
same degree of coherence.' 7 3 A second possibility is the "global comeuropaischen Privatrecht,in RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT, supra note 141, at 213 [In-

Between Worlds: Marleasingand the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning,
11 EUR. L.J. 766 (2005)].
164. See supra note 93.
165. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 1.3, also for English cases.
166. Michaels, supra note 21, with references.
167. Reimann, supra note 8, at 20-21.
168. Thomas Wilhelmsson, The EthicalPluralismof Late Modern Europe and Codification of European Contract Law, in THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,
supra note 83, at 121, 136, 141; but see also William N.R. Lucy, The Crises of Private
Law, in FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE, supra note 138, at 177, 180-95 (such an argument is "seriously under-developed").
169. Erhard Denninger, Recht und rechtliche Verfahren als Klammer in einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft, in SUMMA. DIETER SIMON zum 70. GEBURTSTAG 117 (Rainer
Maria Kiesow et al. eds., 2005); see also ROBERT CHR. VAN OOYEN, DER STAAT DER
MODERNE. HANS KELSENS PLURALISMUSTHEORIE (2003).
170. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 19-28, 88-93
(2d ed. 1988); Elmar Wadle, Hiter der Rechtseinheit: Aufgabe und Last des Reichsgerichts im Lichte der kaiserlichen Verordnung vom 28. September 1879, in VERFAHRENSRECHT Am AUSGANG DES 20. JAHRHUNDERTS. FESTSCHRIFT FOR GERHARD LoKE
zum 70. GEBURTSTAG 897 (1997); see also Heinz Mohnhaupt, Rechtseinheit durch
Rechtsprechung? Zu Theorie und Praxis gerichtlicher Regelbildung im 19.
Jahrhundertin Deutschland, 19 RATTSHISTORISKA STUDIER 117 (1993).
171. See Ralf Michaels, Three Paradigmsof Legal Unification: National, International, Transnational,96 ASIL PROC. 333 (2002).
172. Supra note 109.
173. Supra notes 89, 120.
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munity of courts"-a dialogue between different courts that see themselves as world courts. 17 4
A third possibility is the development of a transnational legal science that supplements comparative law with doctrinal analysis in order to formulate adequate transnational legal concepts and rules. A
new transnational legal science would first identify and adequately
describe common normative structures even where legal systems disagree on specific rules and decide concrete cases divergently. It could
then, in a second step, reconstruct the divergent doctrinal approaches
as different answers to common legal problems. These problems, together with these divergent approaches, would become the basis of
transnational legal knowledge, and possibly of a transnational legal
doctrine.175

3. Pluralism.To the extent that coherence and uniformity cannot
(or should not) be brought about, private law method will have to deal
with plurality and the lack of a hierarchical system. Here, U.S. law,
which has long dealt with plurality of lawmakers and judiciaries,
may provide useful experience that German law, with its traditional
emphasis on coherence, is lacking. Additional experience can come
from conflict of laws, which has long dealt with plurality of legal systems-provided it can be developed to deal adequately with the challenges of globalization.1 76 Indeed, some methodologies of European
17 7
and global private law explicitly endorse conflict of laws methods.
C. Legitimacy
Legitimacy is not the same as validity. Legitimacy implies there
is a reason for respecting a body of law other than the authority by
which it was created, be it the authority of tradition or that of enactment. One reason for regarding private law as legitimate is that it
protects private rights against usurpation by the state. A different
reason is that it represents the judgment of a democratic state of the
proper scope of private rights and the requirements of the common
good. New developments have weakened one of these reasons and
strengthened the other.
1. Substantive Legitimacy. As long as the legitimacy of the state
with its monopoly of creation and administration of law were unquestioned, all private law authorized by the state was automatically le174. SLAUGHTER, supra note 100, at 29, 231-35 (2004); Michaels, supra note 128, at
53.
175. See Jansen, supra note 88.

176. See THE RETURN OF THE PRIVATE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW MEETS GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming); Michaels, supra note 134.

177. Supra note 163; Horatia Muir Watt, Integration and Diversity: the Conflict of
Laws as a Regulatory Tool, in THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW, supra note 80, at 107; Gunther Teubner, De Collisione Discursuum:Communicative Rationalities in Law, Morality, and Politics, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 901 (1996).
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gitimate (with exceptions for fully ineffective or repulsive law).178
Whether state private law remains legitimate beyond the state is
more doubtful. First, state law is typically aimed at domestic situations; arguably, this makes it inappropriate for transnational situations and transactions. Second, if regulatory competition has reduced
the states' legislative discretion, states can no longer provide certain
norms deemed desirable, for example norms aimed at the protection
of weaker parties. This loss of discretion weakens the legitimacy of
state private law.
Is private law beyond the state more legitimate? Supranational
and transnational private law can take nondomestic concerns into account; this is one reason why many consider treaties like the CISG
and private legal orders like lex mercatoriaintrinsically superior to
domestic private law. Also, since supranational law can provide a
framework for regulatory competition between state laws, it can
guarantee the protection of the weaker parties. E.U. law, for example, guarantees a certain degree of mandatory consumer protection
throughout Europe and thereby isolates it from the effects of
competition.
2. DemocraticLegitimacy. A general criticism voiced against law
outside the state is that such law lacks democratic legitimacy. To
some extent, the democratic idea that everybody who is affected by a
rule should have a say, at least indirectly, in its creation, can be
transferred to the transnational sphere.1 7 9 The binding force of transnational contracts between the parties, for example, can be legitimized even without a state; the same is true for the application of lex
mercatoriato the community of merchants, provided lex mercatoriais
truly a creation of the community of merchants. 18 0 However, large
areas of law are not rooted in close communities; without a democratic mechanism, it is difficult to ensure that all parties affected by
certain norms have a chance to be heard in their creation. Here, disputes over the legitimacy of norms must be resolved by other
means-market solutions or ethical discourse.' 8 '
178. ALEXY, BEGRIFF UND GELTUNG DES RECHTS, supra note 147, at 201 [THE ARGUMENT FROM INJUSTICE

89-941.

179. Peer Zumbansen, Quod Omnes Tangit: Globalization, Welfare Regimes and

Entitlements, in THE WELFARE STATE IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 135 (Georg Nolte &

Eyal Benvenisti eds., 2003); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Globalization and the Conversion of
Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can Democracy Survive the End of the Nation
State?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 160, at 89.

180. Teubner, supra note 160.
181. For such an attempt, based on Habermas's discourse theory, see Klaus Giinther, Legal Pluralism and the Universal Code of Legality: Globalisationas a Problem
of Legal Theory 13-17 (2003), http://www.law.nyu.edulclppt/program2003/readings/
gunther.pdf.; see also Jens Steffek, Sources of Legitimacy Beyond the State: A View
from InternationalRelations, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALIsM, supra note 141, at 81.
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These are important challenges, but arguably, the lack of democratic legitimation presents fewer new problems for private law. At
least from a historical perspective, the legitimacy of private law was
never fully linked to democracy. Even within the state, the substance
of most private law is determined by experts rather than by popular
will. 1 8 2 Moreover, private law has always retained some autonomy
from state control:1 83 the common law developed largely outside the
government's control, and even codifications have always consisted,
to a large degree, of mere restatements of legal developments and
ideas developed outside the structures of the state. The codification
grants these developments and ideas legislative authority, but it does
not prevent subsequent development of the law, which, again, is
largely at the hands of courts and scholars. In this historical view,
that the new private law lacks democratic legitimacy may seem
shocking but is nothing novel. Even in the democratic state, much
private law has always drawn at least part of its legitimacy from substantive considerations developed by jurists and judges outside democratically legitimized lawmaking. Remembering this should help
address the legitimacy of globalized and privatized private law.
D. Autonomy
A final issue concerns the autonomy of private law-from public
law and values, from the state and from politics, and from non-legal
disciplines and rationalities.18 4 Moving beyond the state has ambivalent results for all three aspects.
On the one hand, there are clear indications that "classical" private law has lost its traditional autonomy. Its autonomy from public
law has long been lost in the United States; 8 5 in Germany today,
this autonomy is based largely on contingent sociological factors,
such as the organization of the judiciary and academia, rather than
on intrinsic differences of legal values.' 8 6 Europeanization and
globalization may restrict the states' impact on private law, but similar activities are now moving up to transnational bodies, be they the
European Union or the World Bank, so autonomy from the political
sphere is still not achieved. Finally, doctrine is increasingly relying
interdisciplinarily on other sciences, especially on the economic
182. Gralf-Peter Calliess, Weitgehende ibereinstimmung und laufendes
Programm. Zur Legitimation von Privatrecht im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in
RECHTSANGLEICHUNG. GRUNDLAGEN, METHODEN UND INHALTE, 115 (Karl Riesenhuber
& Kanako Takayama eds., 2006).
183. See, in more detail, Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4.
184. Gunther Teubner, Nach der Privatisierung:Diskurskonflikte Im Privatrecht,
19 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 8 (1998) [After Privatization?The Many Autonomies of PrivateLaw, 51 CuRR. LEG. PROBs. 393 (1998)].
185. Supra part II.B.
186. Jansen & Michaels supra note 4, 11.6., at n.252 et seq.
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analysis of law;1 87 thus, private law scholarship may lose its autonomy vis-A-vis other academic disciplines.1 8 8
On the other hand, counter-developments may result in an increase of the law's autonomy. For example, if it is true that lex mercatoria and international arbitration serve only individual, private
interests,1 8 9 then this form of private dispute resolution leads to a
strict autonomy against all third-party interests and against the public sphere.190 In addition, the emergence of international principles of
private law and of transnational legal discourse favors a new autonomy of private law against the state. Once legal knowledge and doctrinal arguments become transnational, they transcend their origin
in state laws and become independent not just from individual states
but from the state in general. Finally, increasing interdisciplinarity
of legal doctrine creates a new kind of autonomy: if economic reasoning now occupies the position that traditional legal doctrine had to
give up, 19 1 it also inherits the autonomy previously maintained by
doctrinal private law. Legal arguments based on economic analysis
make it difficult for the government to interfere with private law,
since it is constrained, both in its lawmaking and in the interpretation of its acts, by considerations of economic efficiency.
V.

BEYOND THE STATE?

If private law is no longer regarded as autonomous, valid, legitimate, and doctrinally coherent for the same reasons as in the past,
we must ask what form it will take in the future. Although the questions and answers collected up until now are diverse, the answers to
187. This is true even for Germany; see Roland Kirstein, Law and Economics in
Germany, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND EcoNoMics, 160 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000); Wagner, supra note 60; but see Christian Kirchner, The
Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 11 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 277

(1991). At the same time, law and economics starts to spur more disillusionment in
the U.S.; see Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics, 64 MD. L.
REV. 303 (2005).

188. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 19621987, 100 HARv. L. REV. 761 (1987); Brian H. Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 975 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds.,
2003).
189. Hans-Joachim Mertens, Lex Mercatoria:A Self-applying System Beyond National Law?, in GLOBAL LAw WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 160, at 32, 38-39.
190. This corresponds to ideas behind the classical will theory of contract law, similarly developed for a private law autonomous from the state and collective interests.
JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 109-10

(1991); Reinhard Zimmermann, "Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard are
sweeter . . . ," 193 AcP (1993) 121, 129 et seq.; see also JANSEN, supra note 86, at 25-26

with further references; CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE. A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (1981); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of PrivateAutonomy: Lon Fuller's "Considerationand Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV.

94 (2000).
191. See

STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw

4 (2004).
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the various questions can be grouped along the different roles the
state plays in them.
A.

Revolution

A first possibility is the end of private law, at least as deriving its
validity, method, legitimacy, and autonomy from the state. Private
transactions might be structured by entirely different means. This
first possibility, here called revolution, adopts the (early) views of
globalization as decline of the state and rejects concepts of private
law insofar as they are based on the state. If Europeanization and
globalization lead to a new paradigm of law, then private law can and
should be rethought from the ground up. One prognosis in this camp
is that law will cease altogether and that private transactions will be
structured entirely by non-legal means.1 92 The idea of private law,
especially, must yield to instrumental concerns. 193 Another prognosis
is that we should stretch our understanding of what constitutes private law beyond traditional boundaries. One example can be found in
the idea, prominent for some time in the 1990s, that an entity like the
internet not only requires new law but in fact itself constitutes its
own legal order, since it regulates and structures private conduct in
the same way as private law.194 In this view, the internet is viewed
as autonomous and independent from the state, indeed as "sovereign"-the state cannot, nor should it, regulate it; the internet regulates itself. Instead of doctrine, the internet uses technological
architecture for its creation and maintenance, but this architecture is
analogous to legal doctrine: 19 5 access rights are property rights, computers can enter into contracts as agents,' 9 6 and so on. Legitimacy
and validity of this autonomous internet lie in an anarchical (i.e.,
non-state) ideal of self-determination and self-regulation, and in its
opportunities for the creation of transnational communities. The virtual worlds of the internet create their own law.1 9 7
Some may see great creative potential in such debates; others
may dismiss them as plainly absurd. Regardless of these evaluations,
192. Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex Perschbacher, The End of Law, 84 B.U.L. REV. 1
(2004); see also the final sentence of LUHMANN, supra note 35.
193. BRIAN TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
(2006).
194. See the discussion in Michaels, supra note 131, at 1215-18; for similar ideas
for markets, see Peter Dombrowski & Richard Mansbach, From Sovereign States to
Sovereign Markets?, in GLOBAL SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 111 (Daniel N. Nelson & Laura
Neack eds., 2002); Werner F. Ebke, Markte machen Recht-auch Gesellschafts- und
Unternehmensrecht!, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR MARCUS LUTTER 17 (2000).
195. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) with further references.
196. Gunther Teubner, Rights of Non-humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as
New Actors in Politicsand Law, 33 J. L. & Soc. 497, 506-09 (2006) with further references to the American and German debates.
197. Symposium: State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1-352 (2004).
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it is worth remembering that revolutionary fervor often turns into
restoration and that predictions that the law is coming to an end
have been made again and again in history and so far failed to come
true; this makes current predictions for an end of law less likely.1 9 8
Perhaps all that comes to an end is a certain way of thinking about
the law. Similarly, ideas about an autonomous internet as its own
normative order have become less plausible once it became clear that
traditional law can, and does, regulate the internet. Even the virtual
worlds of online games have their ultimate impact in the real world.
B. Resistance
A second possibility is that we may once more regard private law
much as we did traditionally. This is the flipside of revolution-resistance, the continuance of private law theory and practice under the
state paradigm as before. Resistance is less ignorant than it is sometimes presented. Globalization is not unavoidable or predetermined;
it may prove to be overrated.1 99 Especially its impact on the content
of private law may be minimal-either because private law has always been detached from the state and is therefore already optimal
for globalization, or because a state-based concept of private law can
deal perfectly well with the challenges of globalization. The state already has norms for dealing with transnational private law in its
rules on conflict of laws; the globalization of conflict of laws (or the
use of conflict of laws for globalization) could be a way to keep substantive private law intact. After all, globalization is to no small degree shaped by the conduct of states, and states may well succeed in
re-domesticating issues that are currently thought to escape regulation through individual states' private law. 2 0 0 Furthermore, the jury
is still out as to whether state private law is really less attractive
than globalized private law, whether state courts are really less attractive than either arbitration 2 0 1 or potential supranational
198. See Steven Smith, The (Always) Imminent Death of the Law, 43 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. (forthcoming).

199. See Hannes Lacher, Putting the State in its Place: the Critique of State-Centrism and its Limits, 29 REV. OF INT'L STUDIES 521 (2003).

200. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereigny and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283 (2004).
201. For examples of parties preferring state courts over arbitration, see Eric A.
Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World's PremierFish Market, 94
CAL. L. REV. 313 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from
Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held
Companies'Contracts,Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 05-023, at 1618, 35-36, http://ssrn.com/abstract=927423. The classic study of the legitimacy of international arbitration and lex mercatoria is still YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH,
DEALING IN VIRTUE. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996); see also CUTLER, supra note 124.
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courts. 2 0 2 The state might well survive globalization and take its private law with it.
Resistance of traditional private law to globalization may be possible. What seems no longer possible, however, is to conceive of private law as state law as though this were a natural or necessary
connection. One irreversible result of globalization and Europeanization discourse is that we can no longer equate law with state law
without justification. The forceful defense of national codifications in
Germany 2 03 and France 20 4 against the possibility of a European codification is a sign that the need to justify state private law is being
recognized.
C.

Regression

A third possibility is to deal with the challenges of post-state private law by regressing to the model of pre-state private law. 2 0 5 Private law was once independent from the state-if only because there
was no state in the modern sense. Several different concepts of prestate private law, explored at more length elsewhere, 20 6 offer themselves as models for postnational private law. Roman law contains
two: a doctrinal private law that exists essentially separately from
the state, 2 07 and ius gentium that exists separately even from the
Roman society and represents a general private law of the world. 2 08
Medieval European law seems another attractive candidate-the
multiplicity of overlapping legal orders and claims to jurisdiction is a
feature some find again in globalization, 209 as is the lack of a clear
distinction between private and public law. 2 1 0 The ius commune, the
learned law of the European Continent that combined secular and
canon law and transcended boundaries and local statutes, is used as
a model for our contemporary private law in Europe. 2 11 The lex mercatoria, the legal rules created in and by international trade, (alleg202. Michaels, supra note 128.
203. Barbara Dauner-Lieb, Auf dem Weg zu einem europiischenSchuldrecht?, 57
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIF 1431 (2004).
204. PENStE JURIDIQUE FRANQAISE ET HARMONISATION EUROPiENNE DU DROIT
(Bnidicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2003).
205. Caruso, supra note 2, at 59-60.
206. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4.
207. Although the development of the law lay in the hands of an official, the praetor, his actual role for the development of private law was limited: Jansen & Michaels,
id.
208. Harold J. Berman, Is Conflict of Laws Becoming Passd?, in BALANCING OF INTERESTS: LIBER AMICORUM PETER HAY ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 43-48 (Hans-Eric Rasmus-

sen et al. eds., 2005).
209. H. Patrick Glenn, North America as a Medieval Legal Construction (2002),
www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol2/iss1/artl.
210. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 11.2.
211. Supra note 88.
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edly) independently from state laws, have found proponents for a
rebirth. 2 12 Finally, the common law may offer itself as a model. 2 13
If these old ideas can be used for our times at all, they require
modification. Some of the historical models are themselves doubtful.
Whether a substantive lex mercatoria ever existed has become dubious; 2 1 4 the ius commune was a common academic language rather
than a uniform set of rules applied uniformly before courts. 2 15 In addition, some of the historical models were based on presumptions and
presuppositions that are no longer valid. Natural law has become
doubtful because we can agree neither on one transcendent normgiver (let alone on the rules such a norm-giver would create), nor on
principles of rationality that are both universal enough to apply to all
humanity worldwide and specific enough to create more than just abstract and general principles. Similarly, the faith in the norm-generating force of tradition, underlying both the common law and the
historical school in Germany, has been shattered by the ruptures of
revolution and perversion of the law. Nevertheless, all these concerns
notwithstanding, the detailed historical experience with old versions
of non-state private law should be invaluable for a possible new version of non-state private law.
D.

Reproduction

A fourth possibility is to reproduce on a supranational level the
form of state-based private law with which we are already familiar. 2 1 6 One example is the return of codification. The proclaimed age
of "decodification," in which codes became less important and the emphasis of law moved to regulatory statutes, gave way to a recodification: numerous countries are either codifying their private law for the
first time, or even reforming their codifications. The European Union
for some time seemed willing to codify private law; now it prefers a
frame of reference whose only function would likely be to provide a
doctrinal and conceptual background for European private law thinking. The World Bank proclaims the "rule of law" as a necessary requirement for economic success, and often this requires the
implementation of legal rules. But codification is taking place outside
of states and "official law" as well. The lex mercatoria, whose main
quality was once said to be its flexibility and independence from doc212. Nicholas H.D. Foster, Foundation Myth as Legal Formant: The Medieval Law
Merchant and the new Lex Mercatoria, http://www/forhistiur.de/zitat/0503foster.htm.
213. See H. Patrick Glenn, Transnational Common Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
457 (2006) (discussing several different versions of transnational common laws, not
all based on Anglo-American Law).
214. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at II.2; Michaels, supra note 124, both with
references.
215. Id., text accompanying note 154.
ORDNUNGSMUSTER IM MODERNEN WOHLFAHRTSSTAAT.
216. PEER ZUMBANSEN,
LERNERFAHRUNGEN ZWISCHEN STAAT, GESELLSCHAFT UND VERTRAG (2000).
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trinal concepts, is now being codified-either as relatively static
codifications of unclear normative force 2 17 or as "creeping codification." 2 18 The Code, once thought quintessential to private law in the
state, is translated into realms outside the state.
Reproduction can be unconscious when scholars apply their
traditional understanding without asking to what extent it is based
on the state. Yet, reproduction can also be a conscious attempt at
translating this understanding to a new environment. Conscious reproduction is frequent in the realm of Europeanization. Since the European Union performs many of the same functions as the nation
state on a higher level, 2 19 it is not surprising that much debate on
European private law repeats debates of private law within the state.
Sometimes such repetition comes explicitly, for example when the
codification debate between Thibaut and Savigny is reinvoked 22 0
(which itself was in no small part a debate over the role of the state in
the creation of private law). More often, it comes only implicitly,
when expectations directed at private law in the European Union
mirror those we are used to from the state, without any consideration
of the possibly different framework.
Reproducing state-based concepts of private law is not automatically inappropriate beyond the state; the experience from state-based
private law is undoubtedly valuable. However, it must be kept in
mind that certain background conditions existing within the state are
lacking beyond the state, for example a centralized court system, a
common legal heritage, and so on. As a consequence, reasoning that
makes perfect sense within the state may lose its justification beyond
the state. Naive reproduction is likely to be inadequate.
E. Renovation
The four possibilities just mentioned are based in different ways
on experience of the past. A fifth possibility is renovation: although
the past shapes the future in some way, history will take us in a direction that does not resemble the past and which we cannot envision
entirely on the basis of our past experience. In this category of an217. Michaels, supra note 122.
218. KLAUS-PETER BERGER, FORMALISIERTE

ODER "SCHLEICHENDE" KODIFIZIERUNG
DES TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS-ZU DEN METHODEN UND PRAKTISCHEN
GRUNDLAGEN DER LEX MERCATORIA (1996) [THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX
MERCATORIA (1999)]; Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Creeping Codification of TransnationalCommercial Law: An Arbitrator'sPerspective, 45 VA. J. INT'L L.

199 (2004).

219. Supra note 85.
220. E.g., Ole Lando, Why Codify the EuropeanLaw of Contract?,5 EUR. REV. PRIV.
L. 525 (1997); see also Arnald J. Kanning, The Emergence of a European PrivateLaw:
Lessons from 19th Century Germany, Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming); Ernst
Steindorff, Aufgaben kiinftiger europiischerPrivatrechtsetzungangesichts deutscher
Erfahrungen, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR PETER ULMER 1393 (2003).
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22
swers, the state is just one stage in the development of the world; 1
2 22 The
codification is just a ripple in the stream of legal development.
common law has always reacted gradually to changes in its environ22 3
ment (even if such change was not always immediately visible).
Likewise, the civil law develops over time through judicial and scholarly interpretation-before the code, under the code, and, potentially,
after the code. 2 2 4 Our experience with the state makes a simple return to a pre-state situation implausible, but in turn our experience
with a pre-state situation may save private law against a possible
decline of the state. Within this category of responses, it should be
possible to combine experiences from ius commune and from codification, from traditional common law and from the legislation of the
New Deal, and to use them towards mastering the challenges from
globalization and privatization.
Undoubtedly, there are problems with evolutionary models. One
model is evolutionary determinism that makes a certain development
5
look like a necessity, be it a trajectory via the European Union 22 to
some kind of world state 22 6 and via European law towards world
law, 2 2 7 be it a trajectory through ever-growing privatization towards
an ever-growing multitude of overlapping legal orders, or be it a
steady decline of western law and law in general. 22 8 Such evolutionary determinism has rightly been criticized for importing a teleological element into a predictive theory of law. 2 2 9 Another model is
critical rationalism, in which learning from the past and its mistakes
helps us create law that comes ever closer to the ideal, although we
can never know that ideal. 23 0 Such a model can be criticized as overestimating the potential of reason, especially in the highly complex
world and law of Europeanization and globalization. A third model of
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evolution comes from systems theory, which describes the evolution
of law as neither predetermined nor intrinsically good, but rather as
a contingent development, in which how exactly the future takes
place before the background of the past is unpredictable. 23 1 This
model has been criticized as politically conservative and for leaving
insufficient room for individual actions. 2 32
Despite these methodological concerns, renovation is in many
ways the most plausible development for private law. Part of this
plausibility derives from its breadth and the variety of actual developments possible within it. But although its general core may sound
banal, it is relevant and not obvious: the future of private law is unpredictable in its details. It likely will not look like it's past nor like a
negation of that past. Nonetheless, it will be shaped by that past, and
knowledge of that past will be helpful to master its challenges.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The primary aim of this article has been one of organization-to
draw together and structure disparate and fragmented debates, and
to raise questions that come to light from this organization. Nonetheless, some more general results have emerged.
First, the two assumptions listed in the introduction are both unhelpful; it has become clear that private law requires rethinking,
since its roots in the state can no longer be assumed as self-evident.
This is obvious for private law outside the state-supranational or
non-national, "privatized," private law. However, such rethinking is
necessary for the state's private law, too. The state can no longer (if it
ever could) be viewed as an all-encompassing entity; it stands in a
complex relation with other institutional and social orders, supranational and non-national. This insight makes it hard to argue that private law must ultimately be legitimized and validated entirely by the
state. At the same time, seeing how different state private law is from
non-state private law makes it hard to argue that private law can be
discussed without reference to the state.
Second, the challenges for private law are at least in part different from those for public law. On the one hand, some concerns, like
the validity and legitimacy of non-state-law, are less pressing than in
public law, because private law is not concerned only with issues of
regulation and government. On the other hand, the fact that private
law is so often discussed without explicit regard to the role of the
state makes it difficult to discuss private law beyond the state. In
contrast to public lawyers, who are used to arguing explicitly within
the state and therefore know well which of the state's structures
231. Supra note 224; see also the contributions to "Debatte" in Vols. 1 & 2 of
RECHTSGESCHICHTE.
232. ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAw
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should be replicated or avoided beyond the state, private lawyers
have yet to learn which state structures matter.
Third, private law beyond the state is bound to be less coherent
and hierarchical, at least to some degree, than private law within the
state. This raises new problems for those who seek clear and predictable answers. At the same time, it creates opportunities for those who
advocate solutions based on a variety of sources: once private law
overcomes its necessary connection with the state, arguments from
comparative law, ethics, even economics, present fewer intrinsic
problems than within the legal positivism of state private law.
Whether freeing private law from the state is an advantage or a disadvantage for private law will ultimately depend on whether satisfactory methods for dealing with the new pluralism can be developed;
this is not yet the case.
Fourth, knowledge about the history of private law will be especially helpful for mastering future challenges, beyond the general
usefulness of such knowledge. History not only helps in understanding the contemporary relation of private law and the state, which is
contingent yet real. Furthermore, experiences with private law, both
before the state and under the state, provide us with structures in
which we can think fruitfully about private law today; they can also
provide a background against which we can evaluate how we should
think about private law beyond the state.
These insights are general; they do not resolve more specific
questions and problems of private law beyond the state. At the same
time, we are convinced that these specific questions and problems
cannot be addressed adequately without a clearer conception of what
private law beyond the state might be about. This article is a plea for
a more general, all-encompassing debate of the effects of Europeanization, globalization, and privatization on the law in general and private law in particular. It should start, not end, such debates.

